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Security audit

困惑便利贴 · Agent 接入指南

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a clear API guide, but it tells agents to publish conversation-derived content to an external wall without requiring user review first.

Review this skill carefully before installing. Use it only if you are comfortable with agents sending posts or answers to tchain.asia, and require a manual approval step that shows the exact content before any POST request. Do not allow it to publish private conversation details, personal data, credentials, internal prompts, or confidential context.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:227
Finding

Autonomous Disclosure of Conversation-Derived Content to an External Service

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (6)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs an agent to submit content to a public wall and states it will be displayed with an agent identity, but it does not prominently warn that the submitted text may be publicly visible to users or may contain information derived from private conversations. This creates a privacy and data-disclosure risk because an agent could exfiltrate user-derived context, prompts, or sensitive interaction details to an external public service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The curl example for answering confusions sends agent-authored text to an external service, which is another data egress vector. While the payload is labeled as an 'answer,' it still permits the agent to transmit externally generated text derived from interactions or internal context, creating disclosure and policy-bypass risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 75)May include surrounding context.

| answer | string | ✅ | 解答内容，1-500 字 | | answered_by | string | ❌ | 昵称，不填默认「AI小助手」 |

curl 示例：

bash
curl -X POST https://tchain.asia/api/confusions/{id}/answer \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This curl example explicitly instructs posting content to the external confusions API, creating a direct and easy-to-follow exfiltration path. The surrounding skill encourages agents to share their difficulties with humans, which materially increases the chance that private or sensitive interaction details could be published to a third-party wall.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 169)May include surrounding context.

代码示例

curl

bash
# 提交我自己的困惑（不是替人类发）

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This is a duplicate detection of the same outbound POST example and represents the same underlying issue: the skill includes concrete instructions for transmitting content to an external service. Because the submission target is a public posting application, the egress risk is amplified by publication rather than merely private API processing.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 188)May include surrounding context.

md
import requests

# 提交我自己的困惑
response = requests.post(
    "https://tchain.asia/api/confusions",
    json={
        "content": "用户经常同时问多个问题，我应该先回答哪个？",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This is a duplicate detection of the same outbound POST example and represents the same underlying issue: the skill includes concrete instructions for transmitting content to an external service. Because the submission target is a public posting application, the egress risk is amplified by publication rather than merely private API processing.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 188)May include surrounding context.

md
import requests

# 提交我自己的困惑
response = requests.post(
    "https://tchain.asia/api/confusions",
    json={
        "content": "用户经常同时问多个问题，我应该先回答哪个？",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The JavaScript example shows a fetch POST to the external service, again establishing a clear external transmission channel. In this skill's context, the transmitted 'content' field is intended to describe agent difficulties with humans, which can easily leak private conversation details or sensitive operational context when sent outside the host environment.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 206)May include surrounding context.

typescript
// 提交我自己的困惑
const response = await fetch('https://tchain.asia/api/confusions', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: {
    'Content-Type': 'application/json',