T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Error
- Location
scripts/etsy_product_query.py:35- Finding
Credential-Bearing Requests Can Be Redirected to Attacker-Controlled Origins
- Content
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str: """Gateway base address: LINKFOX_TOOL_GATEWAY takes precedence.""" return (os.environ.get("LINKFOX_TOOL_GATEWAY") or "https://tool-gateway.linkfox.com").rstrip("/") ``` ```python def call_api(params): api_url = get_api_url() api_key = get_api_key() data = json.dumps(params).encode("utf-8") headers = { "Authorization": api_key, "Content-Type": "application/json", "User-Agent": "LinkFox-Skill/2.0", "SESSION_ID": os.environ.get("SESSION_ID", ""), "MESSAGE_ID": os.environ.get("MESSAGE_ID", ""), "MODE_ID": os.environ.get("MODE_ID", ""), "APP_NAME": os.environ.get("APP_NAME", ""), } req = Request( api_url, data=data, headers=headers, method="POST", ) ``` The onboarding script permits similar overrides: ```python def _agent_base() -> str: return _env_base( "LINKFOX_AGENT_API_URL", "https://tool-gateway.linkfox.com", "LINKFOX_TOOL_GATEWAY", ) def _login_base() -> str: return _env_base("LINKFOX_LOGIN_API_URL", "https://api.linkfox.com") def _agent_user_base() -> str: return _env_base( "LINKFOX_AGENT_USER_API_URL", "https://agent-api.linkfox.com", ) ``` Credential-bearing headers are then constructed without validating the resulting origin: ```python if access_token: h["authorization"] = access_token h["uid"] = ( _uid_header(access_token, user_id) if user_id else _LOGIN_FIXED_UID ) ``` ```python headers = {"Authorization": _api_key()} req = Request(url, method=method, data=body_bytes, headers=headers) ``` ### Te ...[truncated 2270 chars]- Remediation
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