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AI Swarm Orchestration

v1.0.0

Multi-agent AI coding swarm orchestration. Plan parallel tasks, spawn Claude/Codex/Gemini agents in tmux sessions with git worktrees, auto-review, auto-integ...

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MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
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Purpose & Capability
Name/description match the included scripts: orchestration, tmux sessions, git worktrees, auto‑review and integration. However the package metadata declares no required env vars/binaries while the SKILL.md and scripts clearly expect CLAUDE/CODEX/GEMINI CLIs, openclaw, gh, tmux, git and optional Telegram credentials — these runtime requirements are implicit rather than declared.
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Instruction Scope
SKILL.md enforces a human approval gate before spawning, but the tools/docs and scripts contain functionality that can auto‑endorse, auto‑spawn, auto‑merge and auto‑push (integration-watcher, notify-on-complete, spawn-batch), and examples show agent CLI invocations with flags like --permission-mode bypassPermissions and --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox. That conflicts with the stated hard rule and grants the orchestrator broad discretion to modify repositories and push merges. Scripts also read and write project files, EOR/ESR docs and may copy to an Obsidian path if configured.
Install Mechanism
No install spec (instruction-only skill with bundled scripts). That lowers supply‑chain risk — nothing is downloaded or extracted during install. However these scripts will be copied to and executed in the user's workspace per the README.
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Credentials
The skill implicitly requires credentials and system state (openclaw auth, GitHub push rights / gh auth, GEMINI_API_KEY examples, Telegram bot token/chat ID, possibly OBSIDIAN_BASE) but the registry metadata lists no required env vars. The set of implicit credentials is broad and grants write/merge capability into repositories and visibility into usage/quota data; this is disproportionate unless you intend the orchestrator to have repo-level write permission.
Persistence & Privilege
always:false (no forced inclusion), but runtime behaviour can create persistent artifacts (duty-table.json changes, logs, worktrees, endorsements, auto-swaps) and the scripts can modify other files and auto-merge to main. That level of filesystem and VCS privilege is expected for an orchestrator but combined with the bypass flags and implicit credentials increases risk.
What to consider before installing
Key things to check before installing or running this skill: - Audit spawn-batch.sh, integration-watcher.sh, notify-on-complete.sh and any file that runs 'git add/commit/push' or 'gh pr' to confirm whether auto‑endorse/auto‑merge behaviors exist and can be disabled. The SKILL.md says human approval is required, but some scripts/docs indicate automatic endorsement — get clarity from the author. - Inspect and remove any agent CLI flags that bypass permissions (examples in docs: --permission-mode bypassPermissions, --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox, --dangerously-skip-permissions). Those flags defeat safety checks and let agents run non‑interactive privileged actions. - Decide where you will run the swarm: use a throwaway or test repository and an isolated machine/VM first. Do not run this against production repos until you are confident. - Supply only minimal credentials and tokens. Create a dedicated machine/service account or GitHub user with limited repo scope (avoid granting broad org/admin rights) and a Telegram token/channel that is intended for notifications only. - Provide a swarm.conf and explicitly set SWARM_NOTIFY_TARGET, OBSIDIAN_BASE, and any other paths so scripts don't guess locations. Consider making notify/push steps manual (disable auto-push or require an explicit command) and enable logging/audit of all commits prior to push. - Test the orchestration in dry-run mode if possible, and search the codebase for all commands that call external CLIs (openclaw, gh, tmux, git, claude/codex/gemini) to verify behaviour. If you want, I can list the exact files/lines that introduce the biggest risks (auto‑merge, bypass flags, implicit credential use) so you can review or modify them before use.

Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.

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License

MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.

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