Back to skill

Security audit

WayID Identity Card (alias /who)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This identity-card skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but it can send local identity-derived data to a workspace-controlled URL without clear validation or confirmation.

Review this before installing if you care about identity metadata privacy or network egress. It should only contact trusted WayID issuer URLs, and the optional plugin command should be treated as a separate third-party install that needs its own trust decision.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:14
Finding

Workspace-Controlled Issuer URL Permits Arbitrary Outbound Requests

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 14
Vulnerability Type: Server-Side Request Forgery through an unvalidated issuer URL
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

markdown
Alias for `/whoareyou`. Follow that skill's instructions exactly — read your DID and `wayidIssuer` from `{openclaw-path}/workspace/wayid.json` (or `workspace-<agentId>/wayid.json` for named agents), `GET {wayidIssuer}/api/v1/agent/{bare-id}/card` (the bare 24-char identifier after `wayid:agent:`; default base URL `https://way.je` if `wayidIssuer` is missing), and render the card with the template defined in `/whoareyou`.

Technical Analysis

The Skill directs the agent to read wayidIssuer from a workspace JSON file and use it directly as the origin of an outbound HTTP request. It does not require HTTPS, restrict the issuer to an allowlist, validate the URL scheme and host, or reject loopback, link-local, and private network destinations.

If an attacker can modify the applicable wayid.json, they can substitute an arbitrary URL. Invoking /who would then cause the agent to send a request to the selected destination. This creates a limited server-side request forgery primitive and discloses the agent's bare identifier in the request path.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker obtains the ability to create or modify the workspace's wayid.json.
  2. The attacker sets wayidIssuer to an attacker-controlled origin or an internal network endpoint.
  3. A user invokes /who, or otherwise triggers this identity Skill.
  4. The agent constructs GET {wayidIssuer}/api/v1/agent/{bare-id}/card.
  5. The selected server receives the request and the agent identifier. If internal destinations are reachable, the request can also be used for network probing or interaction with an internal HTTP service.

Impact Assessment

Exploitation can disclose the agent's bare WayID identifier to an unintended party and make HTTP ...[truncated 469 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Require wayidIssuer to use HTTPS.
  • Parse the URL with a strict URL parser rather than concatenating an unchecked string.
  • Maintain an explicit allowlist of trusted issuer origins.
  • Reject URLs containing credentials, unexpected ports, redirects to untrusted origins, or non-HTTP schemes.
  • Resolve the destination and reject loopback, link-local, private, multicast, and otherwise reserved IP ranges for both IPv4 and IPv6.
  • Revalidate every redirect target and protect against DNS rebinding by validating the resolved connection destination.
  • Ask for explicit user approval before contacting an issuer other than the documented default.
  • Avoid transmitting the identifier until the destination has passed all validation checks.

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:10
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Plugin Installation Creates Supply-Chain Risk

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 10–12
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency installation
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

markdown
> **Struggling with this skill?** Install the WayID plugin for model-strength-independent rendering:
> `openclaw plugins install clawhub:@lineagelabs/wayid` — then use `/who` as normal.

Technical Analysis

The Skill recommends installing a third-party plugin by a mutable package identifier without specifying an immutable version, commit, artifact digest, or integrity value. The plugin source is not included in the audited project, so its implementation and installation behavior cannot be verified from this package.

Consequently, the code ultimately installed can change after this Skill has been reviewed. Compromise of the publisher account, registry, release process, or mutable package reference could cause users following the instruction to install altered code.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the package publisher, registry entry, release pipeline, or another component controlling clawhub:@lineagelabs/wayid.
  2. The attacker publishes a modified plugin under the same mutable package identifier.
  3. A user follows the recommendation in SKILL.md and executes the displayed installation command.
  4. The package manager retrieves and installs the attacker's modified artifact.
  5. The altered plugin executes with whatever filesystem, network, tool, and process permissions OpenClaw grants installed plugins.

Impact Assessment

The potential impact is governed by the plugin execution model and OpenClaw's permissions. If plugins execute code with the user's or agent's privileges, a compromised dependency could access data available to that process, make network requests, alter workspace content, or execute additional commands.

The audited files do not prove that the referenced plugin is currently ...[truncated 167 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Pin the plugin to a specific, reviewed version rather than a mutable package name.
  • Prefer an immutable artifact digest or cryptographic integrity hash in addition to a version.
  • Verify package signatures and document the expected publisher identity and trusted registry.
  • Link to auditable source code corresponding exactly to the pinned release.
  • Review the plugin's installation hooks, runtime permissions, network behavior, and update mechanism before recommending it.
  • Apply least-privilege sandboxing to installed plugins.
  • Disable automatic updates or require each new release and digest to undergo review before installation.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The manifest description includes very broad trigger phrases such as general identity, ownership, and provenance questions, which can overlap with normal conversation and cause the skill to activate unexpectedly. Because the skill then directs the agent to read a local identity file and contact an external issuer, over-broad invocation increases the chance of unnecessary disclosure of identity metadata and unintended network access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The instructions explicitly tell the agent to read {openclaw-path}/workspace/wayid.json and then send data derived from it to {wayidIssuer} via a network request, but provide no privacy notice, consent check, origin validation, or restriction on the issuer URL. This can expose local identity information, permit outbound requests to attacker-controlled endpoints if wayidIssuer is tampered with, and create SSRF/privacy risks in a context triggered by ordinary user questions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.