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Security audit

WayID Identity Card (alias /way)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent identity-card shortcut, with disclosed but noteworthy network and optional plugin dependencies.

Install this as a simple WayID identity-card shortcut if you are comfortable with it reading the workspace WayID file and contacting the configured issuer. Review wayid.json before use, avoid untrusted or non-HTTPS issuers, and treat the optional WayID plugin install as an extra trust decision because it is a separate mutable package.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:10
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Plugin Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk

Content
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**Struggling with this skill?** Install the WayID plugin for model-strength-independent rendering: > `openclaw plugins install clawhub:@lineagelabs/wayid` — then use `/way` as normal. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill recommends installing `clawhub:@lineagelabs/wayid` without specifying an immutable version, package digest, signature, or integrity value. Consequently, the package installed when a user follows this instruction may differ from the package that existed when the Skill was audited. Because a plugin can have broader behavior and permissions than declarative Skill documentation, compromise of the publisher account, package registry, distribution infrastructure, or a later package release could expose users to code that was not reviewed as part of this project. The repository contains no mechanism for verifying the downloaded plugin's provenance or contents. This finding is limited to the unsafe installation recommendation. The reviewed files do not establish that the currently published plugin is malicious. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the plugin publisher account, registry entry, or package distribution infrastructure, or causes a malicious future release to be published under the same package identifier. 2. A user encounters the troubleshooting guidance in `SKILL.md`. 3. The user runs: ```text openclaw plugins install clawhub:@lineagelabs/wayid ``` 4. The package manager resolves the mutable, unpinned package reference to the attacker-controlled release. 5. OpenClaw installs and loads the unreviewed plugin. 6. Any resulting impact depends on the plugin runtime's permissions, potentially including access to OpenClaw data, tools, network capabilities, or local resources available to the process. ### Impact Assessmen ...[truncated 408 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:13
Finding

Unvalidated Issuer URL Can Direct Agent Requests to Arbitrary Network Targets

Content
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/wayid.json` for named agents), `GET {wayidIssuer}/api/v1/agent/{bare-id}/card` (the bare 24-char identifier after `wayid:agent:`; default base URL `https://way.je` if `wayidIssuer` is missing), and render the card with the template defined in `/whoareyou`. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs the agent to use `wayidIssuer`, read from a workspace JSON file, as the base URL of an outbound HTTP request. It does not require: - An HTTPS URL - A trusted-host allowlist - Validation of the URL scheme, hostname, port, or resolved IP address - Rejection of loopback, link-local, private, or other internal network addresses - Protection against DNS rebinding - Restrictions on redirects to a different origin - User confirmation before disclosing the agent identifier to a configured endpoint If an attacker can create or modify the relevant `wayid.json`, the attacker can influence the destination requested by the agent. This creates a potential server-side request forgery condition in an implementation that follows the instruction literally. The fixed request suffix limits endpoint selection but does not prevent requests to attacker-controlled or internal hosts. The request also discloses the bare 24-character agent identifier in the URL path to the configured destination and potentially to intermediaries if plaintext HTTP is permitted. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker obtains the ability to create or modify `{openclaw-path}/workspace/wayid.json` or the corresponding named-agent file. 2. The attacker sets `wayidIssuer` to an attacker-controlled endpoint or a host reachable ...[truncated 1595 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (1)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill description contains very broad trigger phrases covering many common identity, provenance, and trust questions, which can cause the skill to activate in a wide range of conversations. Because the skill then instructs the agent to read local workspace files and perform a network request to an issuer-controlled endpoint, overly broad invocation increases the chance of unintended data access or external communication in contexts where the user did not explicitly request that behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.