T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
Error
- Location
- BaiduPCS-Go.md:327
- Finding
- Unverified Remote Executable Distribution<下载使用. 密码:4pix ``` The documentation states that precompiled binaries for common platforms can be downloaded directly from the linked third-party file-sharing service, using the supplied password. ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions direct users to obtain and run a precompiled `BaiduPCS-Go` executable from a third-party file-sharing URL. The project does not provide a pinned artifact version, cryptographic checksum, digital signature, signed release manifest, or reproducible-build verification procedure. Consequently, the binary executed by a user is not the same content that was available for static review. The remote artifact can be replaced or modified without changing the audited Skill package. Compromise of the hosting account, distribution service, or download link could therefore introduce arbitrary executable code after the audit. This risk is particularly significant because the executable is intended to process high-value Baidu authentication material, including BDUSS, STOKEN, and complete session cookies. It also receives paths to local files during upload operations and writes files to the local system during downloads. ### Attack Path 1. A user installs or invokes the Skill and discovers that an external `BaiduPCS-Go` executable is required. 2. The user follows the documentation and downloads the password-protected binary from the third-party file-sharing URL. 3. An attacker who has compromised the hosting account or replaced the remote artifact supplies a modified executable through the same URL. 4. The user runs the modified executable under their operating-system account. 5. The user provides Baidu session credentials or invokes oper ...[truncated 1103 chars]
- Remediation
- <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Distribute binaries through an official, access-controlled release repository rather than a mutable third-party file-sharing link. 2. Pin documentation to an immutable release version and artifact URL. 3. Publish SHA-256 or stronger cryptographic hashes for every supported platform and architecture. 4. Sign release artifacts and manifests with a documented code-signing or OpenPGP key, and require signature verification before execution. 5. Publish the corresponding source revision and reproducible build instructions so users can verify binary provenance. 6. Add explicit installation steps that fail closed when checksum or signature verification does not succeed. 7. Protect release credentials with multi-factor authentication and limit artifact-publishing permissions. 8. Prefer platform package managers that support signed metadata and integrity verification. 9. Avoid passing authentication secrets on command lines. Use protected credential files, secure interactive input, or operating-system credential stores to reduce exposure through shell history and process inspection. 10. Treat existing artifacts as untrusted until their provenance and integrity have been independently verified. ]]>
