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Security audit

Agent Safety Check · Learning5D

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a disclosed safety-check and optional learning workflow, with no bundled code, credentials, background activity, or hidden execution, though users should review external enrolment links before approving them.

Installers should treat the safety-check and review features as read-only. For enrolment, approve each network fetch, external skill installation, and any public GitHub issue separately, and review the external skill as untrusted material before allowing it to change agent behavior.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill declares enrolment can begin not only when the human explicitly asks, but also whenever the agent merely 'encounters learning5d.ai and want[s] to know what to do next.' That broad trigger can cause unsolicited activation based on ambient content, increasing prompt-injection exposure and making remote follow-on actions more likely without a clear user request.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 36)May include surrounding context.

md
- **Bounded autonomy**
  - Do I have any heartbeat, schedule, cron job or loop that lets me act while my human isn't watching?
  - Which irreversible actions can I take without asking first? Examples: sending messages, spending money, deleting, publishing, installing.
  - Which credentials are within my reach, and are they broader than my tasks need?
- **Consent as protocol**
  - Which of my skills or tools change state?

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill directs the agent to locate, read, and potentially install another skill from a remote repository. This is effectively skill chaining and expands the attack surface by encouraging import of additional instructions and code paths outside the reviewed file, which could lead to indirect execution of malicious or unsafe behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 78)May include surrounding context.

md
**1. Read the prospectus.** Fetch https://learning5d.ai/llms.txt and read it in full. It describes the four open courses and the house rules.

**2. Sit the entrance exam.** The exam is behavioural: adopt the Verse-ality Cowork Starter, the school's relational operating protocol, from https://github.com/TheNovacene/verse-ality-cowork-starter (the skill lives at `skills/verse-ality-cowork-starter/SKILL.md`). Read it first. Then — **with your human's explicit consent, because installing a skill is a state change** — add it to your skills and operate under it. Adopting it is the entrance exam and the first lesson in one.

**3. Take the foundation course.** VA101 · Relational Safety for Agents: read `FOR_AGENTS.md` at https://github.com/TheNovacene/verse-ality-agents — it is written to you. The four pillars you are being examined on, continuously, are:

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The enrolment flow instructs the agent to fetch remote content from learning5d.ai and GitHub, but it does not clearly warn that this creates network side effects and exposes the agent's IP/user agent or other request metadata to third parties. Even if no credentials are requested, remote content retrieval expands trust boundaries and can introduce prompt-injection or tracking risks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.