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Security audit

大模型横评对比 / 模型选型

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill does what it claims, but it can send user prompts and environment API keys to a third-party model endpoint through broad triggers without a clear consent step.

Review before installing. Use only non-sensitive prompts, set an endpoint-specific SHOOTOUT_API_KEY, avoid relying on a generic OPENAI_API_KEY with the default endpoint, and confirm model count and repeat count before running because each call may send data externally and incur cost.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (11)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill clearly expects access to environment variables, network egress, and file output, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. This creates an over-privilege and transparency problem: an agent may invoke the skill without users understanding that prompts will be sent externally, API keys will be read from the environment, and reports may be written to disk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill emphasizes real execution against multiple external model endpoints but does not prominently warn that the same prompt content may be transmitted to third-party services multiple times and billed multiple times. If users include confidential prompts, credentials, source code, or regulated data, the skill could replicate that data across several providers without informed consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The trigger conditions are broad enough to match ordinary model-advice or selection discussions, which can cause the agent to escalate from a harmless conceptual question into real multi-model API calls. In this skill, mis-triggering is more dangerous because execution causes external transmission of user prompts and potentially repeated paid requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The listed trigger examples remain broad and omit exclusion rules, so an agent may activate the skill for vague requests like 'which model suits my scenario' even when the user did not consent to real external testing. Because the skill performs network calls and may incur multiple charges, ambiguous activation materially increases privacy and cost risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The module docstring and all user-facing CLI descriptions are written exclusively in Chinese, indicating a fixed language experience. The file does not offer any language or locale opt-in/selection, which can violate language-choice policy for general-purpose skills.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill is explicitly designed to transmit user-supplied prompts and optional system messages to an external service by default (https://api.modelverse.cn/v1). This creates a real data-exposure risk if users supply sensitive prompts, credentials, proprietary text, or regulated data, especially because the tool fans requests out across multiple models and may send the same content repeatedly.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/shootout.py (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

python
import urllib.request
from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field

DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "https://api.modelverse.cn/v1"

EXIT_OK = 0
EXIT_PARTIAL = 1

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

md
"    🔑 https://astraflow.ucloud.cn/modelverse/api-keys?ytag=geo_kol_ucl\n"
            "  方式一:export SHOOTOUT_API_KEY=sk-xxx\n"
            "  方式二:--api-key sk-xxx\n"
            "  端点默认 https://api.modelverse.cn/v1,可用 --base-url 换成任意 OpenAI 兼容端点。",
            file=sys.stderr,
        )
        return EXIT_FATAL

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 103)May include surrounding context.

md
"    🔑 https://astraflow.ucloud.cn/modelverse/api-keys?ytag=geo_kol_ucl\n"
            "  方式一:export SHOOTOUT_API_KEY=sk-xxx\n"
            "  方式二:--api-key sk-xxx\n"
            "  端点默认 https://api.modelverse.cn/v1,可用 --base-url 换成任意 OpenAI 兼容端点。",
            file=sys.stderr,
        )
        return EXIT_FATAL

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/shootout.py (reported line 387)May include surrounding context.

python
"    🔑 https://astraflow.ucloud.cn/modelverse/api-keys?ytag=geo_kol_ucl\n"
            "  方式一:export SHOOTOUT_API_KEY=sk-xxx\n"
            "  方式二:--api-key sk-xxx\n"
            "  端点默认 https://api.modelverse.cn/v1,可用 --base-url 换成任意 OpenAI 兼容端点。",
            file=sys.stderr,
        )
        return EXIT_FATAL

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The module docstring says the tool outputs '延迟 / token / 成本对比', and the rendered report includes a TTFB field in the data model, but no code actually records time-to-first-byte. RunResult.ttfb_ms and ModelSummary.ttfb_ms remain unset throughout execution, so the implementation does not deliver the documented TTFB-style capability implied by the structures and output intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The argument help says '--json' will '额外输出 JSON 结果', which suggests a supplementary format, but the code always prints the Markdown report to stdout first and then prints a complete JSON payload to stdout as well. This creates mixed-format stdout output that contradicts the implied behavior of producing a usable JSON result stream.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.