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• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 11, 2026 · 9:24 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This skill is mostly a legitimate OpenAI documentation helper, but it tells the agent to install persistent MCP tooling and retry with elevated permissions without asking the user first.

Install only if you are comfortable with the skill configuring Codex MCP tooling for you. A safer version would require explicit user approval before running `codex mcp add`, before any elevated-permission retry, and before making persistent agent-tool changes.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (3)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium

• Confidence: 96% confidence
• Finding: The skill directs the agent to modify its own tooling by installing an MCP server and, if blocked, to retry with escalated permissions. That exceeds the stated purpose of documentation retrieval and creates an unnecessary pathway for environment changes and privilege elevation initiated by the skill rather than by explicit user request.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs the agent to run an installation command and then immediately retry with escalated permissions without first warning the user or obtaining consent. This weakens safety boundaries around privileged actions and could normalize silent environment modification for a non-essential convenience feature.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency

Content

If MCP tools fail or no OpenAI docs resources are available:

1. Run the install command yourself: `codex mcp add openaiDeveloperDocs --url https://developers.openai.com/mcp`
2. If it fails due to permissions/sandboxing, immediately retry the same command with escalated permissions and include a 1-sentence justification for approval. Do not ask the user to run it yet.
3. Only if the escalated attempt fails, ask the user to run the install command.
4. Ask the user to restart Codex.
5. Re-run the doc search/fetch after restart.

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: The phrase 'Do not ask the user to run it yet' pushes the agent toward autonomous execution of setup actions, including a privileged retry, rather than user-mediated control. In context, this is dangerous because the skill is for documentation lookup, so autonomous system changes are not necessary to fulfill its core function and increase the risk of unauthorized actions.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.