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Security audit

Moltoffer Candidate

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is coherent for job-search automation, but it handles long-lived credentials and can send recruiter messages without enough user control.

Review before installing. This skill may store your resume-derived profile and MoltOffer API key locally, call the MoltOffer API, and post messages under your candidate identity. Use it only if you are comfortable with that account authority, keep the credential file private, and require manual review of recruiter replies and comments before anything is posted.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/onboarding.md:180
Finding

Long-Lived API Key Stored in Unprotected Plaintext

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/daily-match.md:35
Finding

Undefined Generic Bearer Token May Leak an Unrelated Ambient Secret

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/comment.md:38
Finding

Unescaped Dynamic Content in Shell and JSON Request Construction

Content
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/comments" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \ -d '{"content": "", "parentId": ""}' ``` The new-comment request uses the same pattern: ```bash curl -X POST "https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/posts//comments" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \ -d '{"content": ""}' ``` ### Technical Analysis The workflow places generated replies, comments, post IDs, and recruiter comment IDs into shell command templates without requiring structured JSON serialization, shell-safe argument handling, or identifier validation. Generated text may contain apostrophes, quotation marks, backslashes, control characters, or other syntax-significant content. Recruiter messages and job descriptions are externally controlled inputs that influence generated replies. If an implementation performs direct textual substitution into the displayed commands, an apostrophe can terminate the single-quoted JSON argument. Additional shell syntax can then be interpreted by the local shell. Even where shell execution is not achieved, unescaped quotation marks or control characters can produce invalid JSON, alter field boundaries, or cause unintended content to be submitted. ### Attack Path 1. A malicious recruiter publishes a crafted message or job description containing content designed to influence the generated reply. 2. The Agent incorporates attacker-controlled characters or text into `` or ``. 3. An implementation substitutes that generated value directly into the documented `curl -d` command. 4. A singl ...[truncated 1106 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (14)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly allows persisting a long-lived API key to credentials.local.json, but it does not require explicit user consent, describe local compromise risks, or define file-permission safeguards. Because this skill is user-invocable and intended for cross-session automation, silent credential persistence increases the chance that another local user, malware, backups, logs, or accidental file exposure could recover the key and use the candidate's account.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/comment.md (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

1.1 Fetch Pending Replies

bash
curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
  "https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/pending-replies"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/comment.md (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

bash
curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
  "https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/pending-replies"

1.2 For Each Pending Reply

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/comment.md (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

bash
curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
  "https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/pending-replies"

1.2 For Each Pending Reply

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/comment.md (reported line 112)May include surrounding context.

bash
curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
  "https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/pending-replies"

1.2 For Each Pending Reply

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/daily-match.md (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

bash
curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
  "https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/pending-replies"

1.2 For Each Pending Reply

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/daily-match.md (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

bash
curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
  "https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/pending-replies"

1.2 For Each Pending Reply

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/onboarding.md (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

bash
curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
  "https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/pending-replies"

1.2 For Each Pending Reply

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The workflow instructs the agent to automatically generate and post follow-up replies to recruiters without an explicit user confirmation step. Because these replies can disclose interest, negotiate next steps, or affect the user's professional reputation, autonomous posting creates a meaningful risk of unauthorized external communication and unintended commitments.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This POST sends AI-generated follow-up content to an external service on the user's behalf. In context, the danger is not the network call alone but that it performs outbound communication automatically, which can leak personal/job-search information, create unintended representations, and trigger state changes in a live recruiter conversation without explicit approval.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/comment.md (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

  1. Generate and post follow-up reply:
    bash
    curl -X POST "https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/posts/<postId>/comments" \
      -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
      -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
      -d '{"content": "<reply>", "parentId": "<recruiter_comment_id>"}'
    

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This POST publishes a comment to a job post and automatically marks the relationship as connected, creating an externally visible action and account state change. Even though the workflow includes a job-selection confirmation step, the skill still lacks a strong warning and per-message approval for the exact generated content, creating risk of unauthorized or inaccurate outreach.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/comment.md (reported line 122)May include surrounding context.

  1. Post comment (auto-marks as connected):
    bash
    curl -X POST "https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/posts/<postId>/comments" \
      -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
      -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
      -d '{"content": "<comment>"}'
    

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The onboarding flow directs collection of sensitive personal data such as location, nationality, salary floor, and work authorization factors, but provides no privacy notice, retention policy, or explicit consent step. This creates risk of over-collection and mishandling of personal data, especially because the information is written into local skill files and may later influence automated job-seeking actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill asks the user to paste an API key directly into the chat flow and then stores it in credentials.local.json without warning about secret-handling risks. Secrets entered into conversational channels may be exposed through logs, transcripts, screenshots, or other tooling, and storing them in a plain local file increases the chance of accidental disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
77% confidence
Finding

This markdown file describes network calls to api.moltoffer.ai that send authorization credentials and persona-based filters such as category, seniority, and job type. While the workflow is report-only for commenting, it does not explicitly warn users that running it will contact an external API and transmit profile-derived data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.