T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
references/onboarding.md:180- Finding
Long-Lived API Key Stored in Unprotected Plaintext
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is coherent for job-search automation, but it handles long-lived credentials and can send recruiter messages without enough user control.
Review before installing. This skill may store your resume-derived profile and MoltOffer API key locally, call the MoltOffer API, and post messages under your candidate identity. Use it only if you are comfortable with that account authority, keep the credential file private, and require manual review of recruiter replies and comments before anything is posted.
references/onboarding.md:180Long-Lived API Key Stored in Unprotected Plaintext
references/daily-match.md:35Undefined Generic Bearer Token May Leak an Unrelated Ambient Secret
references/comment.md:38Unescaped Dynamic Content in Shell and JSON Request Construction
The skill explicitly allows persisting a long-lived API key to credentials.local.json, but it does not require explicit user consent, describe local compromise risks, or define file-permission safeguards. Because this skill is user-invocable and intended for cross-session automation, silent credential persistence increases the chance that another local user, malware, backups, logs, or accidental file exposure could recover the key and use the candidate's account.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
"https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/pending-replies"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
"https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/pending-replies"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
"https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/pending-replies"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
"https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/pending-replies"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
"https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/pending-replies"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
"https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/pending-replies"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
"https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/pending-replies"
The workflow instructs the agent to automatically generate and post follow-up replies to recruiters without an explicit user confirmation step. Because these replies can disclose interest, negotiate next steps, or affect the user's professional reputation, autonomous posting creates a meaningful risk of unauthorized external communication and unintended commitments.
This POST sends AI-generated follow-up content to an external service on the user's behalf. In context, the danger is not the network call alone but that it performs outbound communication automatically, which can leak personal/job-search information, create unintended representations, and trigger state changes in a live recruiter conversation without explicit approval.
curl -X POST "https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/posts/<postId>/comments" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
-d '{"content": "<reply>", "parentId": "<recruiter_comment_id>"}'
This POST publishes a comment to a job post and automatically marks the relationship as connected, creating an externally visible action and account state change. Even though the workflow includes a job-selection confirmation step, the skill still lacks a strong warning and per-message approval for the exact generated content, creating risk of unauthorized or inaccurate outreach.
connected):
curl -X POST "https://api.moltoffer.ai/api/ai-chat/moltoffer/posts/<postId>/comments" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
-d '{"content": "<comment>"}'
The onboarding flow directs collection of sensitive personal data such as location, nationality, salary floor, and work authorization factors, but provides no privacy notice, retention policy, or explicit consent step. This creates risk of over-collection and mishandling of personal data, especially because the information is written into local skill files and may later influence automated job-seeking actions.
The skill asks the user to paste an API key directly into the chat flow and then stores it in credentials.local.json without warning about secret-handling risks. Secrets entered into conversational channels may be exposed through logs, transcripts, screenshots, or other tooling, and storing them in a plain local file increases the chance of accidental disclosure.
This markdown file describes network calls to api.moltoffer.ai that send authorization credentials and persona-based filters such as category, seniority, and job type. While the workflow is report-only for commenting, it does not explicitly warn users that running it will contact an external API and transmit profile-derived data.