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Security audit

Cloud Architect

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a cloud architecture guidance skill with some cautions needed around cloud cleanup examples, but I found no hidden execution, persistence, or credential-stealing behavior.

Installers should treat this as advisory cloud architecture material, not an automation package. Before following cleanup or purchasing recommendations, confirm resource ownership, dependencies, retention needs, backups, change windows, and approvals. If copying the Spot interruption example, update it to use AWS IMDSv2.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
references/cost.md:112
Finding

Unauthenticated AWS Instance Metadata Service Request

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Cloud Metadata Access

High
Category
Server-Side Request Forgery
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/cost.md (reported line 113)May include surrounding context.

md
def check_spot_termination():
    try:
        response = requests.get(
            "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/spot/termination-time",
            timeout=2
        )
        if response.status_code == 200:

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The trigger list contains broad, generic cloud terms such as vendor names and common architecture topics that are likely to appear in ordinary conversation, increasing the chance the skill is invoked when the user did not actually request this specialized behavior. Over-broad invocation can cause unintended context switching, irrelevant guidance, or overshadowing of a more appropriate skill, which is a real security and reliability concern in agent routing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The checklist recommends potentially destructive actions such as deleting volumes, snapshots, AMIs, load balancers, and terminating instances without any warning, dependency checks, backup guidance, or rollback considerations. In a skill intended to guide cloud architecture and cost optimization, users may copy these actions directly, creating a realistic risk of service disruption or irreversible data loss.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.