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Security audit

Chaos Engineer

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is coherent chaos-engineering guidance, but its copy-pastable examples can disrupt real infrastructure and include unsafe rollback, privilege, and scoping patterns that need human review before installation.

Install only if you want an agent to help draft chaos-engineering plans and code, and require users to review every generated command before use. Treat the examples as unsafe starting points: restrict them to approved non-production or tightly controlled game-day environments, add target allowlists, pin remote manifests and images, use least-privilege credentials, require manual approvals, and add tested rollback and cleanup before running anything.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (6)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
references/infrastructure-chaos.md:236
Finding

Root Command Injection Through Unsanitized Domain Input

Content
View full analysis
> /etc/hosts' ], check=True) print(f"Blocked DNS for {domain}") yield finally: # Wait for duration time.sleep(duration_seconds) # Remove entry from /etc/hosts subprocess.run([ 'sudo', 'sed', '-i', f'/127.0.0.1 {domain}/d', '/etc/hosts' ], check=True) print(f"Restored DNS for {domain}") ``` ### Technical Analysis The caller-controlled `domain` value is interpolated into a command passed to `sudo sh -c`. Because the shell interprets the resulting string, command substitutions and other shell syntax embedded in `domain` are evaluated with root privileges. Double quotation marks do not prevent command substitution. For example, a domain containing `$(command)` can cause `command` to execute before the generated text is appended to `/etc/hosts`. The cleanup operation also inserts the unescaped domain into a `sed` expression. Although that call does not use a shell, specially crafted regular-expression or delimiter content can alter which lines are removed. The root shell exceeds the minimum privilege necessary for generating chaos-test configuration and creates a direct privilege-escalation path when the domain is not fully trusted. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker influences the domain supplied to `DNSChaos.block_domain()`. 2 ...[truncated 635 chars]
Remediation
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T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
references/chaos-tools.md:241
Finding

Unverified Remote Kubernetes Manifest Is Retrieved and Applied

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
references/kubernetes-chaos.md:317
Finding

Mutable Latest Container Image Used in Kubernetes Verification Pod

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
references/infrastructure-chaos.md:92
Finding

AWS Availability-Zone Simulation Leaves AZ Rebalancing Suspended

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
references/kubernetes-chaos.md:217
Finding

Node Drain Logic Can Evict Protected Workloads Across All Namespaces

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/chaos-tools.md:486
Finding

Unauthenticated Chaos Dashboard Binds to All Network Interfaces

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
Findings (27)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

md
| Kubernetes | `references/kubernetes-chaos.md` | Pod, node, Litmus, chaos mesh experiments |

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/chaos-tools.md (reported line 239)May include surrounding context.

md
aws-secret-access-key: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
          aws-region: us-east-1

      - name: Update kubeconfig
        run: |
          aws eks update-kubeconfig --name staging-cluster --region us-east-1

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/chaos-tools.md (reported line 241)May include surrounding context.

md
aws-secret-access-key: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
          aws-region: us-east-1

      - name: Update kubeconfig
        run: |
          aws eks update-kubeconfig --name staging-cluster --region us-east-1

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The document provides multiple destructive chaos-engineering procedures—instance termination, network degradation, resource exhaustion, DNS tampering, and container stoppage—without prominent guardrails, scope limits, rollback steps, or warnings about production impact. In a skill intended to guide users, omission of safety constraints materially increases the chance that users apply these actions against live systems and cause outages or data disruption.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The AWS AZ failure example actively terminates running EC2 instances and deregisters targets from a load balancer, but does not prominently warn that this can immediately remove capacity and disrupt production traffic. In this skill context, the code is operationally plausible and easy to adapt, so lack of safeguards makes accidental misuse especially dangerous.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The resource exhaustion commands can consume most CPU and memory, perform heavy disk writes, and saturate network bandwidth, which can freeze a host, affect colocated workloads, or trigger cascading service degradation. Because the snippet is copy-pastable and lacks warnings about shared infrastructure, it creates a real risk of unintended denial of service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The description uses broad activation terms such as 'designing chaos experiments' and 'game day exercises' without clear boundaries, which can cause the skill to be invoked during general DevOps or incident-planning conversations. Because this skill is capable of producing failure-injection and disruption guidance, accidental invocation increases the chance of unsafe or inappropriate operational recommendations in contexts that did not explicitly request chaos actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger list is expansive and includes common operational phrases like 'resilience testing,' 'blast radius,' and tool names that may appear in ordinary SRE, Kubernetes, or incident-management discussions. In this skill's context, overbroad triggers are more dangerous because the skill is designed to output implementation code for fault injection, which could lead to unintended disruptive guidance being surfaced too readily.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

This section documents automated instance termination in production-like environments without any explicit safety warning, guardrails, or scoping guidance. In a chaos-engineering skill, destructive examples are expected, but omitting cautions about blast radius, approvals, environment isolation, and rollback makes misuse and accidental disruption more likely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The Gremlin examples directly launch CPU and network attacks against specified targets via API calls, yet the documentation does not warn about service degradation, dependency impact, or authorization requirements. Because the code is ready to operationalize disruptive actions, readers could apply it unsafely to live systems.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/chaos-tools.md (reported line 82)May include surrounding context.

md
def __init__(self, api_key: str, team_id: str):
        self.api_key = api_key
        self.team_id = team_id
        self.base_url = "https://api.gremlin.com/v1"
        self.headers = {
            "Authorization": f"Key {api_key}",
            "Content-Type": "application/json"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/chaos-tools.md (reported line 111)May include surrounding context.

md
}
        }

        response = requests.post(
            f"{self.base_url}/attacks/new",
            headers=self.headers,
            json=payload

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/chaos-tools.md (reported line 156)May include surrounding context.

md
}
        }

        response = requests.post(
            f"{self.base_url}/attacks/new",
            headers=self.headers,
            json=payload

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/chaos-tools.md (reported line 181)May include surrounding context.

md
}
        }

        response = requests.post(
            f"{self.base_url}/scenarios",
            headers=self.headers,
            json=payload

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The scheduled GitHub Actions workflow installs chaos tooling, mutates cluster state, and runs pod-deletion experiments on a schedule, but it lacks an explicit warning about recurring disruption to staging infrastructure. Scheduled destructive automation increases the chance of unintended outages, noisy tests, and operational confusion if readers adopt it verbatim.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The Jenkins pipeline creates and applies chaos manifests dynamically and executes disruptive experiments, but the documentation does not explicitly warn about the operational impact or the fact that it writes files used to mutate cluster state. In this context, the missing cautions increase the risk of users running the pipeline in inappropriate environments or with unsafe parameters.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/experiment-design.md (reported line 118)May include surrounding context.

md
raise ValueError("Production >10% requires feature flag AND auto-rollback")

        if self.max_duration_seconds > 600:
            raise ValueError("Max duration cannot exceed 10 minutes without approval")

# Progressive blast radius expansion
def progressive_rollout() -> list[BlastRadiusConfig]:

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The runbook includes concrete failure-injection commands that reboot an RDS instance with failover, revoke database network access, and simulate a connection leak, but it does not place an explicit safety warning immediately around those steps requiring confirmation of a non-production target and authorization before execution. In a chaos-engineering skill, such commands are expected, but without strong guardrails they can be copied into the wrong environment and cause real service disruption, data-path outages, or unintended incident escalation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/infrastructure-chaos.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md
def create_proxy(self, name: str, listen: str, upstream: str):
        """Create proxy to inject failures."""
        response = requests.post(f"{self.base_url}/proxies", json={
            "name": name,
            "listen": listen,
            "upstream": upstream,

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/infrastructure-chaos.md (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

md
def add_latency(self, proxy: str, latency_ms: int, jitter_ms: int = 0):
        """Add latency toxic."""
        return requests.post(
            f"{self.base_url}/proxies/{proxy}/toxics",
            json={
                "name": "latency",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/infrastructure-chaos.md (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

md
def add_latency(self, proxy: str, latency_ms: int, jitter_ms: int = 0):
        """Add latency toxic."""
        return requests.post(
            f"{self.base_url}/proxies/{proxy}/toxics",
            json={
                "name": "latency",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/infrastructure-chaos.md (reported line 51)May include surrounding context.

md
def add_latency(self, proxy: str, latency_ms: int, jitter_ms: int = 0):
        """Add latency toxic."""
        return requests.post(
            f"{self.base_url}/proxies/{proxy}/toxics",
            json={
                "name": "latency",

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/infrastructure-chaos.md (reported line 169)May include surrounding context.

md
# CPU stress test using stress-ng

# Install stress-ng
sudo apt-get install -y stress-ng

# Stress CPU - use 80% of available cores for 5 minutes
stress-ng --cpu $(nproc --all) --cpu-load 80 --timeout 5m

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The DNS failure simulation modifies /etc/hosts with sudo and delays cleanup until after the context exits, which can break local name resolution for the host and any dependent processes if interrupted or misused. The absence of warnings and robust restoration logic makes this more dangerous than a purely illustrative example.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

Appending entries to /etc/hosts creates system-wide state that persists beyond the immediate command and may remain if cleanup fails, the process is killed, or sed removal does not match exactly. In a chaos-testing skill, this persistent host modification is hazardous because it can silently redirect or break traffic after the experiment ends.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/infrastructure-chaos.md (reported line 241)May include surrounding context.

md
def block_domain(domain: str, duration_seconds: int = 60):
        """Block DNS resolution for domain by pointing to localhost."""
        try:
            # Add entry to /etc/hosts
            subprocess.run([
                'sudo', 'sh', '-c',
                f'echo "127.0.0.1 {domain}" >> /etc/hosts'