Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a focused Mimo API diagnostic helper; it uses local config credentials and test API calls in ways that fit its stated purpose, but users should review the endpoint and config edit before running it.
Install only if you intend to troubleshoot this Mimo/OpenClaw provider. Before running the commands, confirm that ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json points to the provider endpoint you trust, use only non-sensitive test prompts, and back up openclaw.json before applying the toolCall=true fix.
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
BASE_URL=$(python3 -c "import json; d=json.load(open('$HOME/.openclaw/openclaw.json')); print(d['models']['providers']['custom']['baseUrl'])")
curl -s "$BASE_URL/models" -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" | python3 -m json.tool | head -20
### Step 2: 测试无工具调用
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
curl -s "$BASE_URL/chat/completions" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
curl -s "$BASE_URL/chat/completions" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
### 原因 3: API 端点不支持 function calling
**症状**：curl 测试带 tools 也返回 400
**修复**：确认使用的是正确的 mimo-v2.5-pro 端点，不是其他不支持 tools 的模型。
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
### 原因 3: API 端点不支持 function calling
**症状**:curl 测试带 tools 也返回 400
**修复**:确认使用的是正确的 mimo-v2.5-pro 端点,不是其他不支持 tools 的模型。
The skill clearly instructs shell usage, reads local configuration files, performs network requests, and modifies user configuration, but it declares no explicit tool scope or permissions. That mismatch increases the chance an agent executes sensitive operations without clear user awareness or policy gating.
These instructions extract an API key from a local config and immediately use it in outbound curl requests, but provide no warning about credential sensitivity, endpoint trust, or data transmission. In an agent setting, this can lead to secrets being exposed to unintended services or users executing network diagnostics without understanding the risk.
This command sends prompts and model parameters to an external API using a locally sourced bearer token. Even though the goal is diagnosis, it still transmits potentially sensitive metadata and normalizes outbound requests without an explicit trust boundary warning.
curl -s "$BASE_URL/chat/completions" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
The tool-calling test transmits prompts, tool schema, and authentication credentials to an external service. In the context of agent skills, this can leak operational details about local tool structure and encourage automatic outbound traffic without clear consent.
curl -s "$BASE_URL/chat/completions" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
The skill provides a Python one-liner that overwrites the user's configuration file in place, changing model settings without backup, validation, or rollback guidance. A mistake in the script or concurrent edits could corrupt configuration or silently alter security-relevant behavior such as enabling tool calling.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# Test 2: 无工具调用
echo "--- Test 2: 无工具调用 ---"
RESULT=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 10 "$BASE_URL/chat/completions" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"model":"mimo-v2.5-pro","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hello, reply with one word"}],"max_tokens":50}' 2>/dev/null || true)
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# Test 2: 无工具调用
echo "--- Test 2: 无工具调用 ---"
RESULT=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 10 "$BASE_URL/chat/completions" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"model":"mimo-v2.5-pro","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hello, reply with one word"}],"max_tokens":50}' 2>/dev/null || true)
The skill content is written entirely in Chinese, including the description and operating instructions, with no indication that the user can choose another language. The policy requires flagging language or locale constraints when they are imposed without user opt-in or documented justification.
This markdown file is written entirely in Chinese and does not indicate that the language is optional, user-selectable, or required for a specific regional/compliance reason. Under the stated policy, a skill document that implicitly forces a specific language without opt-in is a natural-language policy concern.
The script's comments and all user-facing status messages are written in Chinese, including usage, diagnostics, and error output. This imposes a specific language on users without any opt-in, fallback, or indication that the skill is intentionally region-specific.