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Security audit

Agnes Video Generator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill coherently generates videos through the Agnes API, with the main user consideration being that prompts and image URLs are sent to an external service and may incur API costs.

Install only if you are comfortable using an Agnes API key and sending your video prompts, image URLs, and generation parameters to Agnes for processing; avoid sensitive or private media unless that external processing is acceptable.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (7)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The README presents the skill instructions entirely in Chinese and does not indicate that language is selectable or user-configurable. Under SQP-3, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill says it is invoked automatically when the user requests video generation, but it does not define narrow triggering conditions or user confirmation boundaries. That can cause the agent to route common creative/media requests into this skill unexpectedly, leading to unintended external API use, unnecessary spending, and transmission of user content to a third party.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill documents that prompts and image URLs are sent to Agnes endpoints, but it does not clearly warn users that their text and media references will be transmitted to an external service. This creates a privacy and consent risk, especially if users provide sensitive prompts, private image URLs, or internal-only resources that the agent then shares with a third party.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The header comment states the script 'returns video URL', establishing clear expected behavior. However, the emitted result at L055-L062 sets url to result.remixed_from_video_id, which appears to be a video identifier/reference rather than a URL, contradicting the documented output intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This code sends user-supplied prompt content and optional image input to a third-party service via HTTPS, which can affect user privacy. Although network transmission is central to the script's purpose, the file contains no explicit disclosure, confirmation, or warning that these inputs are being sent off-system.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

This markdown file documents setting an AGNES_API_KEY and later sending prompts and image URLs to a remote video-generation service, but it does not warn users that their prompts, referenced media, and job metadata will be transmitted to a third-party service. For markdown files, SQP-2 applies when descriptions omit warnings about behaviors that could affect user data or privacy.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The usage string illustrates the prompt argument exclusively with Chinese text ("描述"), which implies a language expectation without any opt-in or explanation. This can constitute a natural-language locale policy issue because the file does not indicate that other languages are supported or that Chinese is required for a justified regional reason.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.