ClawHub
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Security audit

Agent Master Skills Clawhub Pkg

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The scanners rate this skill benign with high confidence: all three reported findings are considered expected for its purpose, though the instruction-scope dimension is noted for broad activation triggers.

The verdict is benign, not a guarantee of no risk. Skillspector reported broad activation instructions and a configuration-path reference, while the other scanner completed without findings; the reported scan covered all three listed components.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 65)May include surrounding context.

md
| **Codex CLI** / Replit Agent | `.agents/skills/` | `~/.agents/skills/` |
| **Cursor** | `.cursor/skills/` | `~/.cursor/skills/` |
| **Gemini CLI** | `.gemini/skills/` | — |
| **Google Antigravity** | `.agent/skills/` | `~/.gemini/config/skills/` |
| **Hermes Agent** | `.hermes/skills/` | `${HERMES_HOME:-$HOME/.hermes}/skills/` |
| **Grok Build** | `.grok/skills/` | `~/.grok/skills/` |
| **Devin** | `.devin/skills/` | `${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}/devin/skills/` |

The byterover entry requires invocation before any work, without limiting activation to knowledge-management tasks.

Medium
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

L141 says, "You MUST use this for gathering contexts before any work." This universal activation condition includes unrelated requests and provides no exclusions, potentially causing unnecessary skill invocations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The using-superpowers entry activates at the start of any conversation, regardless of user intent.

Medium
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

L529 specifies "Use when starting any conversation," making ordinary greetings and unrelated requests activation conditions. The entry does not limit this trigger to skill discovery or another specific workflow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.