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Security audit

Config Format Converter

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward guide for converting JSON, YAML, and TOML config files, with only a minor dependency-installation caution.

Before using it, install dependencies in a virtual environment and consider pinning reviewed versions. Back up original config files before conversion because comments and formatting may be lost when converting between formats.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:151
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Python Dependencies## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 151–155 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party dependencies and insufficient supply-chain integrity controls **Risk Level**: Medium **Vulnerable Code**: ```bash pip install pyyaml toml ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented installation command retrieves `pyyaml` and `toml` without version constraints, package hashes, or a lock file. Consequently, the installed artifacts depend on whichever releases and package index are available when the command runs. This prevents reproducible installation and does not provide integrity verification beyond pip's default transport and index controls. Python package installation may execute attacker-controlled build or installation logic. If an upstream project, release process, package-index account, or configured package index is compromised, following this instruction could install and execute a malicious package version. The project contains no evidence that such a compromise has occurred; this finding concerns the avoidable exposure created by the installation guidance. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises an upstream dependency release, its publishing credentials, or a package index trusted by the user's pip configuration. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release of a referenced dependency. 3. A user follows the Skill's unpinned `pip install pyyaml toml` instruction. 4. Pip resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled release. 5. Malicious build or installation logic executes with the privileges of the user running pip. 6. The installed package may execute additional malicious behavior when imported by the conversion examples. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user or automation account performing the installation. Depending on that account's access, the attacker could read or modify accessible project files, configu ...[truncated 208 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions - Pin each dependency to a reviewed exact version rather than resolving the latest available release. - Store dependency constraints in a version-controlled requirements or lock file. - Generate and verify cryptographic hashes, then install with a command such as `pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt`. - Explicitly use an approved package index and prevent untrusted extra indexes from taking precedence. - Periodically review and update pinned versions after vulnerability and provenance checks. - Prefer installation inside an isolated virtual environment or restricted build environment using a non-privileged account. - Where supported, verify package provenance and retain a vetted internal package mirror for CI/CD use.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep