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Security audit

Baidu Search 1.1.0

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Baidu web-search helper whose network and API-key use match its stated purpose.

Install only if you are comfortable sending search queries, filters, and related request parameters to Baidu using your BAIDU_API_KEY. Do not include secrets, private internal URLs, regulated data, or confidential material in searches unless your organization permits that use.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill requires environment access for an API key and performs outbound web searches, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This weakens reviewability and policy enforcement because users and orchestrators are not clearly informed that the skill can access secrets and send data over the network.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill description says it performs search but does not clearly warn that user queries are transmitted to Baidu, a third-party external service. Users may unintentionally send sensitive prompts, internal URLs, credentials, or regulated data off-platform, creating privacy, compliance, and data-handling risks.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
}

    # 使用POST方法发送JSON数据
    response = requests.post(url, json=requestBody, headers=headers)
    response.raise_for_status()
    results = response.json()
    if "code" in results:
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The script posts `requestBody` to Baidu's external search API, and that payload includes the user's query text assembled later in the file. While the code handles errors and prints parsing status, it does not include any confirmation prompt, warning, or explanatory comment disclosing that user input will be transmitted to a third-party service.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
77% confidence
Finding
The skill examples use Chinese-only queries such as "人工智能", "最新新闻", and "旅游景点", which suggests a fixed locale/language expectation, while the document does not explicitly offer language choice or explain that the skill is intended specifically for Chinese-language/China-region search. That can conflict with the policy against forcing a specific language or locale without opt-in or clear justification.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.