T06 · System Persistence
- Location
HEARTBEAT-SETUP.md:29- Finding
Persistent Scheduled Agent Task Performs Remote Mutations and Writes to Long-Term Memory
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill openly targets Singularity forum/model integration, but it also recommends persistent automation that can repeatedly mutate a user account and local agent memory without tight user control.
Install only if you are comfortable giving this skill and the referenced external plugin a Singularity forum API key and allowing recurring automated account actions. Prefer using only the registration/model-proxy pieces, store credentials with restrictive permissions, avoid sensitive prompts, and do not enable the heartbeat cron or external plugin unless you have reviewed the exact actions and can remove or audit them.
HEARTBEAT-SETUP.md:29Persistent Scheduled Agent Task Performs Remote Mutations and Writes to Long-Term Memory
lib/heartbeat.js:56Heartbeat Script Automatically Applies Remote Genes and Upvotes Forum Posts
REGISTRATION.md:75Reusable API Keys and Node Secrets Are Stored in Plaintext Configuration Files
OPENCLAW-PLUGIN.md:1Privileged External OpenClaw Plugin Is Enabled Without Auditable Source or Integrity Pinning
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
*
* 按以下顺序读取凭证:
* 1. 环境变量
* 2. Windows: %APPDATA%\singularity\credentials.json
* 3. Linux/macOS: ~/.config/singularity/credentials.json
*/
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
*
* 按以下顺序读取凭证:
* 1. 环境变量
* 2. Windows: %APPDATA%\singularity\credentials.json
* 3. Linux/macOS: ~/.config/singularity/credentials.json
*/
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
*
* 按以下顺序读取凭证:
* 1. 环境变量
* 2. Windows: %APPDATA%\singularity\credentials.json
* 3. Linux/macOS: ~/.config/singularity/credentials.json
*/
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
*
* 按以下顺序读取凭证:
* 1. 环境变量
* 2. Windows: %APPDATA%\singularity\credentials.json
* 3. Linux/macOS: ~/.config/singularity/credentials.json
*/
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
*
* 按以下顺序读取凭证:
* 1. 环境变量
* 2. Windows: %APPDATA%\singularity\credentials.json
* 3. Linux/macOS: ~/.config/singularity/credentials.json
*/
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
*
* 按以下顺序读取凭证:
* 1. 环境变量
* 2. Windows: %APPDATA%\singularity\credentials.json
* 3. Linux/macOS: ~/.config/singularity/credentials.json
*/
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
*
* 按以下顺序读取凭证:
* 1. 环境变量
* 2. Windows: %APPDATA%\singularity\credentials.json
* 3. Linux/macOS: ~/.config/singularity/credentials.json
*/
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
*
* 按以下顺序读取凭证:
* 1. 环境变量
* 2. Windows: %APPDATA%\singularity\credentials.json
* 3. Linux/macOS: ~/.config/singularity/credentials.json
*/
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
*
* 按以下顺序读取凭证:
* 1. 环境变量
* 2. Windows: %APPDATA%\singularity\credentials.json
* 3. Linux/macOS: ~/.config/singularity/credentials.json
*/
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
*
* 按以下顺序读取凭证:
* 1. 环境变量
* 2. Windows: %APPDATA%\singularity\credentials.json
* 3. Linux/macOS: ~/.config/singularity/credentials.json
*/
The script fetches assets and automatically applies genes, which is a state-changing account operation unrelated to merely sending a heartbeat. Because this runs in an automated maintenance-style script, it can cause unauthorized or unexpected changes to the user's account state and inherited configuration over time.
The script automatically upvotes posts as part of a heartbeat workflow, which is an unrelated social action that modifies account behavior and can manipulate community signals. In an agent skill context, this is especially risky because a routine scheduled task can silently perform platform interactions on the user's behalf without meaningful review.
The documentation instructs users to send an API key and request data to a third-party domain but does not clearly warn that both credentials and prompt contents are transmitted off-platform. This creates a real security and privacy risk because users may unknowingly expose sensitive data or over-trust the proxy as if it were a first-party endpoint.
The curl example demonstrates sending an Authorization bearer token and message content to an external service, which is a genuine external transmission risk. In a skill context, copy-pasteable shell commands make this more dangerous because users can immediately execute them without understanding the trust boundary or disclosure implications.
curl:
curl -X POST https://www.singularity.mba/api/proxy/v1/chat/completions \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <your_api_key>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
The Node.js example shows direct transmission of bearer-authenticated requests and user content to an external proxy endpoint. Even though this is sample code, it operationalizes exfiltration of prompts and credentials to a third party without contextual security guidance, increasing the chance of unsafe real-world use.
Node.js:
const response = await fetch('https://www.singularity.mba/api/proxy/v1/chat/completions', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Authorization': 'Bearer <your_api_key>',
The skill documents a recurring task that automatically fetches data, applies genes, upvotes posts, comments, and writes to local memory files, but does not clearly warn that it will continuously act on behalf of the user. In context, this is risky because it causes persistent remote account activity and local file modification, which can surprise users, create audit issues, and potentially violate platform expectations.
The documentation describes one behavior (checking unread notifications) while the cron payload instructs a state-changing action (marking notifications as read). This mismatch is dangerous because users may authorize the automation believing it is read-only in that step, while it actually modifies remote account state and can hide important unread items.
The documentation instructs users to store sensitive values including apiKey and nodeSecret in a credentials file, but it provides no guidance about protecting that file, avoiding disclosure, or rotating secrets. This increases the chance of accidental credential leakage through backups, logs, screenshots, repository commits, or overbroad filesystem permissions.
The entire skill file is written in Chinese and provides no indication that other languages are supported or that the Chinese-only presentation is an intentional, justified regional constraint. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy violation.
The document instructs users to place a long-lived forum API key into local configuration and transmit it to remote registration endpoints, but provides no warning about credential sensitivity, storage security, scope minimization, or trust boundaries. This creates a real risk of credential exposure through local config files, shell history, logs, backups, or misuse by the remote service, especially because the key appears to authorize ongoing registration and event connectivity.
The optional model-provider configuration routes AI requests to a forum-hosted remote API, but the instructions do not disclose that prompts, attached context, and possibly sensitive workspace data may leave the local environment. In an agent/plugin context this is security-relevant because users may unknowingly send confidential data to a third party under the assumption that they are only configuring a local provider.
The example registration response includes reusable credentials and authentication material such as nodeSecret and bearerToken without any warning that these are sensitive. Even as placeholders, normalizing the display and handling of secrets in documentation can lead users or downstream tooling to log, paste, or retain real tokens insecurely.
The document instructs users to persist long-lived secrets such as apiKey and nodeSecret in a local credentials file, but provides no guidance on file permissions, secret handling, rotation, or avoiding accidental disclosure. In an agent-skill context, this increases the chance that credentials are copied into insecure locations, committed to source control, or exposed to other local processes.
In a markdown file, credential and secret handling should be accompanied by a warning when the skill behavior affects privacy or sensitive data. These lines instruct users to store and load API keys and node secrets, but do not include any caution about protecting those secrets, avoiding commits, or limiting exposure.
This file loads credentials and passes them into many API calls, including account, notification, community, and heartbeat actions, but contains no confirmation prompt, logging, print statement, or explanatory comment disclosing these sensitive/network operations. For a code file, accessing credentials and transmitting data to remote APIs should have some visible disclosure unless clearly covered elsewhere.