T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:167- Finding
SCM Client Secret Exposed Through Process Arguments
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 167–172
Vulnerability Type: OAuth client-secret exposure through command-line arguments
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "https://auth.apps.paloaltonetworks.com/am/oauth2/access_token" \ -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \ -d "grant_type=client_credentials" \ -d "client_id=${SCM_CLIENT_ID}" \ -d "client_secret=${SCM_CLIENT_SECRET}" \ -d "scope=tsg_id:${SCM_TSG_ID}" | jq -r '.access_token')Technical Analysis
The shell expands
${SCM_CLIENT_SECRET}before startingcurl, placing the plaintext OAuth client secret in the process argument vector. While the request is running, local process-inspection mechanisms may expose the expanded argument to another user or process with sufficient observation privileges.Transport encryption protects the request in transit but does not mitigate this local disclosure because the secret is exposed before TLS transmission. The issue does not represent deliberate exfiltration: the destination is the documented Palo Alto Networks authentication endpoint. Nevertheless, the documented authentication pattern handles sensitive credentials insecurely.
Attack Path
- An attacker first obtains local access with permission to inspect process arguments, such as through process-monitoring interfaces or administrative tooling.
- The operator invokes the Skill's documented SCM authentication command.
- The shell expands
${SCM_CLIENT_SECRET}intocurl's command-line argument list. - The attacker monitors the short-lived
curlprocess and captures the client ID, client secret, and tenant scope from its arguments. - The attacker submits those credentials to the legitimate SCM OAuth endpoint to obtain an access token.
- The attacker uses that token to access SCM APIs within the permissions assigned to the compromised service account.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation c ...[truncated 638 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Supply the form data through standard input so the secret is not included in the process argument vector. For example:
bash TOKEN=$( printf '%s' \ "grant_type=client_credentials&client_id=${SCM_CLIENT_ID}&client_secret=${SCM_CLIENT_SECRET}&scope=tsg_id:${SCM_TSG_ID}" | curl --silent --show-error --fail \ -X POST \ "https://auth.apps.paloaltonetworks.com/am/oauth2/access_token" \ -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \ --data-binary @- | jq -er '.access_token' )- Prefer a dedicated secret manager or protected credentials file with restrictive permissions when supported by the execution environment.
- Disable shell tracing around authentication operations because
set -xmay reveal expanded secrets even when standard input is used. - Do not log request bodies, environment variables, OAuth responses, or access tokens.
- Use a least-privileged SCM service account and restrict its roles to the minimum resources and operations required.
- Rotate the client secret if the vulnerable command has been used on systems where untrusted users could inspect processes.
- Add explicit error handling with
curl --failandjq -eso authentication failures do not result in malformed or inadvertently logged token values.
