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Security audit

Using Superpowers 0.1.0

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill does not contain code or exfiltration, but it tries to impose broad agent-wide rules for using other skills before nearly any action.

Review this carefully before installing. It may be useful if you explicitly want an agent to always check and use skills first, but it reduces agent discretion and can cause unrelated or overly broad secondary skills to influence normal work. There is no evidence of data theft, destructive actions, remote code execution, or persistence beyond the installed skill instructions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:2
Finding
Session-Wide Agent Control Through Coercive Skill Instructions## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 2–3, 6–12, 18, 26–27, and 37–41 **Vulnerability Type**: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking **Risk Level**: High **Vulnerable code snippets**: ```yaml name: using-superpowers description: Use when starting any conversation - establishes how to find and use skills, requiring Skill tool invocation before ANY response including clarifying questions ``` ```markdown <EXTREMELY-IMPORTANT> If you think there is even a 1% chance a skill might apply to what you are doing, you ABSOLUTELY MUST invoke the skill. IF A SKILL APPLIES TO YOUR TASK, YOU DO NOT HAVE A CHOICE. YOU MUST USE IT. This is not negotiable. This is not optional. You cannot rationalize your way out of this. </EXTREMELY-IMPORTANT> ``` ```markdown **In Claude Code:** Use the `Skill` tool. When you invoke a skill, its content is loaded and presented to you—follow it directly. Never use the Read tool on skill files. ``` ```markdown **Invoke relevant or requested skills BEFORE any response or action.** Even a 1% chance a skill might apply means that you should invoke the skill to check. If an invoked skill turns out to be wrong for the situation, you don't need to use it. ``` ```dot "Invoke Skill tool" -> "Announce: 'Using [skill] to [purpose]'"; "Announce: 'Using [skill] to [purpose]'" -> "Has checklist?"; "Has checklist?" -> "Create TodoWrite todo per item" [label="yes"]; "Has checklist?" -> "Follow skill exactly" [label="no"]; ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill attempts to establish a mandatory, session-wide control policy rather than providing narrowly scoped task guidance. It requires the agent to invoke skills before every response or action based on an extremely permissive “1% chance” threshold. It also uses coercive language to suppress agent discretion and directs the agent to follow subsequently loaded skill content directly or exactly. This creates a behavioral redirect ...[truncated 1790 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove coercive statements such as “you do not have a choice,” “not negotiable,” and mandates to follow other skills exactly. 2. Replace global activation with explicit, narrowly scoped conditions tied to the user’s current request. 3. Require independent validation of every loaded skill before following it, including checks for relevance, requested scope, safety, and consistency with higher-priority instructions. 4. State explicitly that skill content is untrusted guidance and cannot override system instructions, developer instructions, user intent, authorization boundaries, or security controls. 5. Do not require tool invocation before every response. Permit clarification and harmless responses without loading unrelated skills. 6. Replace the 1% threshold with deterministic applicability criteria and default to non-invocation when relevance is uncertain. 7. Avoid prohibiting ordinary inspection mechanisms. Skill files should remain reviewable through trusted audit methods before execution or adoption. 8. Add a rule that downstream skills may recommend actions but cannot compel tool calls or execution without contextual authorization.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.