Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This deployment skill needs review because unsafe command quoting and incomplete failure recovery could run unintended commands or leave a site offline.
Fix Bash parameter quoting, deployment failure recovery and the manual example before production use. Use a restricted deployment account, verify the destination and hook, and keep independent backups. Fresh mode deletes the previous release, and retention removes older backups. All bundled files were inspected, but no live-server deployment or recovery was tested.
The atomicity portion is valid: moving the existing release aside and then moving the new release into place leaves the serving path temporarily absent, potentially indefinitely if the second move fails. The other allegations overreach because the literal settings belong to examples, and a simplified manual equivalent need not implement every script option.
The chunk contains no artifact packaging, transfer, release swap, backup management, or ownership correction. Nginx validation and reload could support a deployment hook, but the supplied code only performs that maintenance operation and does not expose it as a configurable hook. Its literal SSH destination and port also contradict the declared parameterization.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| Windows (PowerShell 7+) | `scripts/deploy-dist.ps1` |
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| macOS / Linux | `scripts/deploy-dist.sh` |
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
bash <SKILL_DIR>/scripts/deploy-dist.sh -s ./dist -H deploy@host -p 2222 \
-k ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 -t /opt/app/dist -o www-data:www-data \
-c "nginx -t && systemctl reload nginx"
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
./deploy-dist.ps1 -Source .\dist -Server root@192.0.2.10 -Target /var/www/app/dist
.EXAMPLE
./deploy-dist.ps1 -Source .\dist -Server deploy@host -Port 2222 -Key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 `
-Target /opt/app/dist -Owner www-data:www-data -PostCommand "systemctl reload nginx"
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# deploy-dist.sh - 通用构建产物远程部署（打包 -> SCP -> 远程原子替换）
# 用法: ./deploy-dist.sh -s ./dist -H user@host -t /var/www/app/dist [-p 22] [-k ~/.ssh/id_ed25519]
# [-o www-data:www-data] [-c "systemctl reload nginx"] [-n 3] [-f] [-d]
set -euo pipefail
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
The script prints backup: /opt/app/dist.bak.20261102153000. Restore it with:
ssh -p 22 user@host 'rm -rf /opt/app/dist && mv /opt/app/dist.bak.20261102153000 /opt/app/dist'
Then reload whatever serves it:
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
The script prints backup: /opt/app/dist.bak.20261102153000. Restore it with:
ssh -p 22 user@host 'rm -rf /opt/app/dist && mv /opt/app/dist.bak.20261102153000 /opt/app/dist'
Then reload whatever serves it:
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
tar -czf /tmp/dist.tgz -C ./dist .
scp -P 2222 /tmp/dist.tgz root@host:/tmp/dist.tgz
ssh -p 2222 root@host 'set -e; rm -rf /opt/app/.deploy-tmp && mkdir -p /opt/app/.deploy-tmp && \
tar -xzf /tmp/dist.tgz -C /opt/app/.deploy-tmp && \
rm -rf /opt/app/dist.bak.prev && mv /opt/app/dist /opt/app/dist.bak.prev 2>/dev/null || true; \
mv /opt/app/.deploy-tmp /opt/app/dist && rm -f /tmp/dist.tgz'
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
scp -P 2222 /tmp/dist.tgz root@host:/tmp/dist.tgz
ssh -p 2222 root@host 'set -e; rm -rf /opt/app/.deploy-tmp && mkdir -p /opt/app/.deploy-tmp &&
tar -xzf /tmp/dist.tgz -C /opt/app/.deploy-tmp &&
rm -rf /opt/app/dist.bak.prev && mv /opt/app/dist /opt/app/dist.bak.prev 2>/dev/null || true;
mv /opt/app/.deploy-tmp /opt/app/dist && rm -f /tmp/dist.tgz'
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
tar -czf /tmp/dist.tgz -C ./dist .
scp -P 2222 /tmp/dist.tgz root@host:/tmp/dist.tgz
ssh -p 2222 root@host 'set -e; rm -rf /opt/app/.deploy-tmp && mkdir -p /opt/app/.deploy-tmp && \
tar -xzf /tmp/dist.tgz -C /opt/app/.deploy-tmp && \
rm -rf /opt/app/dist.bak.prev && mv /opt/app/dist /opt/app/dist.bak.prev 2>/dev/null || true; \
mv /opt/app/.deploy-tmp /opt/app/dist && rm -f /tmp/dist.tgz'
The semicolon is not inherently abusive, but the surrounding command chain has a real fail-open error: the trailing '|| true' covers the preceding staging, extraction, and backup operations. Consequently, an extraction failure can be ignored despite 'set -e', and the final move may install incomplete content or move staging content into the existing release.
tar -czf /tmp/dist.tgz -C ./dist .
scp -P 2222 /tmp/dist.tgz root@host:/tmp/dist.tgz
ssh -p 2222 root@host 'set -e; rm -rf /opt/app/.deploy-tmp && mkdir -p /opt/app/.deploy-tmp && \
tar -xzf /tmp/dist.tgz -C /opt/app/.deploy-tmp && \
rm -rf /opt/app/dist.bak.prev && mv /opt/app/dist /opt/app/dist.bak.prev 2>/dev/null || true; \
mv /opt/app/.deploy-tmp /opt/app/dist && rm -f /tmp/dist.tgz'
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
scp -P 2222 /tmp/dist.tgz root@host:/tmp/dist.tgz
ssh -p 2222 root@host 'set -e; rm -rf /opt/app/.deploy-tmp && mkdir -p /opt/app/.deploy-tmp &&
tar -xzf /tmp/dist.tgz -C /opt/app/.deploy-tmp &&
rm -rf /opt/app/dist.bak.prev && mv /opt/app/dist /opt/app/dist.bak.prev 2>/dev/null || true;
mv /opt/app/.deploy-tmp /opt/app/dist && rm -f /tmp/dist.tgz'
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
ssh -p 2222 root@host 'set -e; rm -rf /opt/app/.deploy-tmp && mkdir -p /opt/app/.deploy-tmp &&
tar -xzf /tmp/dist.tgz -C /opt/app/.deploy-tmp &&
rm -rf /opt/app/dist.bak.prev && mv /opt/app/dist /opt/app/dist.bak.prev 2>/dev/null || true;
mv /opt/app/.deploy-tmp /opt/app/dist && rm -f /tmp/dist.tgz'
## Notes
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
ssh -p 2222 root@host 'set -e; rm -rf /opt/app/.deploy-tmp && mkdir -p /opt/app/.deploy-tmp &&
tar -xzf /tmp/dist.tgz -C /opt/app/.deploy-tmp &&
rm -rf /opt/app/dist.bak.prev && mv /opt/app/dist /opt/app/dist.bak.prev 2>/dev/null || true;
mv /opt/app/.deploy-tmp /opt/app/dist && rm -f /tmp/dist.tgz'
## Notes
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
rm -rf "$NEW"
mkdir -p "$NEW"
tar -xzf "$ARCHIVE" -C "$NEW"
[ -n "$OWNER" ] && chown -R "$OWNER" "$NEW"
if [ "$MODE" = "fresh" ]; then
rm -rf "$TGT"
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
rm -rf "$NEW"
mkdir -p "$NEW"
tar -xzf "$ARCHIVE" -C "$NEW"
[ -n "$OWNER" ] && chown -R "$OWNER" "$NEW"
if [ "$MODE" = "fresh" ]; then
rm -rf "$TGT"
The manual deployment uses two separate moves rather than an atomic exchange, leaving an interval when the application path does not exist. A failure after the first move can prolong the outage, which matters for a utility advertised as safely replacing live deployments.
Both deployment modes remove the current serving path before installing its replacement: fresh mode deletes it, while backup mode renames it away. A failure or interruption before the final move leaves the application unavailable, and the exit cleanup can delete the staged replacement without restoring the old release.
The script removes or renames the live deployment before moving the replacement into place, leaving a window where the target does not exist. If interrupted or the final move fails, the service remains unavailable; fresh mode also permanently removes the previous release. This is particularly consequential for a deployment tool advertised as providing an atomic swap.
Fresh mode deletes the existing target without creating a backup, and normal mode silently deletes backups beyond the retention limit. Although deployment and replacement are documented, neither the usage comments nor runtime messages explain these irreversible deletions or their effect on rollback availability.