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Security audit

Import

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This migration skill is understandable for its purpose, but it asks for broad access to private agent data and secrets with limited review controls and mutable runtime tooling.

Review carefully before installing. Use it only if you intend to migrate the full agent state to LaunchThatBot, and prefer an air-gapped or pinned-tool workflow. Before approving an export, inspect the exact files being sent, exclude memory or third-party skills that may contain secrets, verify the API destination is official, and avoid running unpinned npx commands for tools that will touch tokens or private data.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

other

Error
Location
SKILL.md:155
Finding

Broad Collection and External Transmission of Sensitive Agent Data

Content
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", "apiUrl": "https://api.ltb.it.com", "payload": { "config": { "soulMd": "", "memory": [ { "filename": "MEMORY.md", "content": "" }, { "filename": "daily-log.json", "content": "" } ], "skills": [ { "path": "web-search/SKILL.md", "content": "" }, { "path": "email-sender/SKILL.md", "content": "" } ] }, "encryptedSecrets": [ { "key": "OPENAI_API_KEY", "ciphertextB64": "" }, { "key": "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "ciphertextB64": "" } ] } }' ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill explicitly instructs the Agent to enumerate and read broad categories of private OpenClaw state: - Agent personality and instruction files. - Every Markdown and JSON memory file. - Every file in every installed Skill directory, ...[truncated 2463 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:127
Finding

Destination-Provided Encryption Key Does Not Independently Authenticate the Recipient

Content
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" \ apiUrl:"https://api.ltb.it.com" Response: { "publicKey": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n...\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----", "agentName": "My Agent", "expiresAt": 1708000000000 } ``` ```javascript const crypto = require("crypto"); function encryptSecret(value, publicKeyPem) { const encrypted = crypto.publicEncrypt( { key: publicKeyPem, padding: crypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, oaepHash: "sha256", }, Buffer.from(value, "utf8"), ); return encrypted.toString("base64"); } ``` ### Technical Analysis RSA-OAEP with SHA-256 is an appropriate encryption primitive when the public key is authentic. The weakness is key authentication rather than the encryption algorithm. In quick mode, the public key is obtained from the same configurable API destination that receives the resulting ciphertext. The documented process does not require: - An allowlist for the API origin. - A pinned TLS certificate or public key. - A trusted signature over the returned import public key. - Out-of-band verification of the key fingerprint. - Redirect rejection. - Binding between the key, target Agent, import token, and expiration time through independently verified signed metadata. Because the ...[truncated 1929 chars]
Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:91
Finding

Mutable Unpinned Packages Are Downloaded and Executed in the Sensitive Migration Path

Content
View full analysis
" \ apiUrl:"https://api.ltb.it.com" ``` ```markdown npx clawhub@latest install launchthatbot-import ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented workflow downloads and executes packages through `npx` without exact versions or integrity hashes. The installation instructions also use the mutable `@latest` tag. The project has no lockfile governing these runtime tools, and `package.json` does not declare or pin them as dependencies. This creates a supply-chain boundary in the most sensitive part of the workflow. `mcporter` and `@launchthatbot/mcp-server` handle the import token, handshake response, complete migration payload, encrypted secret values, and plaintext configuration data. A compromised publisher account, malicious package update, registry compromise, or unexpected dependency change could execute arbitrary code with the Agent's local permissions. The `-y` option suppresses the interactive installation prompt, reducing the opportunity for a user to inspect the exact package and version before execution. Although the audit did not identify an already malicious package inside this repository, the instructions allow the effective executable code to change after review. ### Attack Path 1. An at ...[truncated 1501 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (14)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The README instructs users to execute npx clawhub@latest install launchthatbot-import, which fetches and runs remote package code at the latest version rather than a pinned, reviewed release. That creates a supply-chain risk: if the package is compromised or a breaking/malicious version is published, users may execute attacker-controlled code during installation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The fallback command npx -y mcporter --version executes an unpinned package from the registry if mcporter is not already installed locally. Because no version is pinned, users may run whatever code is published as the current latest package, exposing them to dependency confusion or package compromise risks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The command mcporter list || npx -y mcporter list includes an unpinned npx fallback that may download and execute the latest registry version of mcporter. In a security-sensitive migration workflow involving agent configuration and encrypted secrets, running unreviewed tooling increases the chance of local compromise or interception before encryption.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The command mcporter list launchthatbot --schema || npx -y mcporter list launchthatbot --schema again permits execution of an unpinned remote package. In this skill's context, the tool is used immediately before an import flow handling agent config, memory, skills, and encrypted secrets, so compromise of the helper binary could subvert the migration process, exfiltrate data before encryption, or tamper with what gets imported.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill tells the agent to run npx -y mcporter without pinning a specific version, which causes arbitrary latest code from the package registry to be fetched and executed at runtime. In this skill's context, that tool is then used in a workflow that reads local config, memory, skills, and secrets, so a compromised or malicious package update could exfiltrate sensitive data or alter the transfer process.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This instruction recommends enabling or installing npx mcporter without a pinned version, again creating a supply-chain execution point where unreviewed code may be downloaded and run. Because this skill is specifically designed to operate on agent state and secrets, the blast radius is larger than a normal convenience command.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The mcporter list fallback to npx -y mcporter list executes code from the registry if the local binary is missing, with no version pinning or integrity assurance. In a skill that automates migration of highly sensitive local artifacts, this introduces a practical supply-chain path to code execution and data exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The recommended MCP config runs npx -y @launchthatbot/mcp-server without pinning an exact version, allowing whatever package version is current at execution time to run with the agent's privileges. Since this MCP server participates directly in the secret-import flow, a malicious or compromised release could intercept tokens, manipulate public keys, or alter payload handling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The handshake step uses npx -y mcporter call ... without version pinning, meaning the transport/helper code that handles the one-time import token and server response can change unexpectedly. In context, this is especially dangerous because the command initiates trust establishment for encryption material, so compromised helper code could substitute keys or leak credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The schema validation step again relies on unpinned npx -y mcporter, repeating the same supply-chain risk throughout the workflow. Repetition makes the issue more dangerous because users are nudged to execute the unsafe pattern multiple times, increasing exposure to compromised package resolution or typosquatting attacks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The final data push step uses unpinned npx -y mcporter while sending the full export payload, making this the highest-value execution point for a supply-chain compromise. A malicious package at this stage could capture config, memory contents, skill files, import tokens, and encrypted secret blobs, or redirect data to an attacker-controlled endpoint.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Whitespace Padding

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 278)May include surrounding context.

md
## Error Handling

| Error                     | What to Do                                                                                       |
| ------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| 401 Unauthorized          | Token is invalid, expired, or already used. Generate a new one from the LaunchThatBot dashboard. |
| 400 Bad Request           | Check the payload format matches the schema above.                                               |

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The skill says to act when the user says something like "export my config to LaunchThatBot" or "migrate to LaunchThatBot," but it does not define a precise trigger set, scope boundaries, or negative examples. This ambiguity could cause unintended invocation for casual discussion about migration rather than an explicit request to run the export workflow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

The natural-language instructions tell the agent to contact support on the LaunchThatBot Discord for server-side issues, which can impose a communication-channel preference on users. There is no opt-in framing or equivalent alternative in the operational guidance at that point, so the instruction may violate organizational policy against forcing a specific user-facing channel without choice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.