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Security audit

Video Download FaaS

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill does what it claims at a high level, but its isolation claim is not backed by the packaged files and its shared /tmp process state can expose URLs or let the wrong process be killed.

Review before installing. Use this only in a low-privilege account and avoid private, signed, or token-bearing URLs until session files are moved to a private directory with restrictive permissions, PID/session validation is added, and the isolation documentation is either implemented or corrected.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/kill-download.sh:24
Finding

Untrusted PID Files Allow Unauthorized Process Termination

Content
View full analysis
/dev/null; then echo "Process already terminated (PID: $PID)" rm -f "$SESSION_FILE" "$PID_FILE" "$LOG_FILE" exit 0 fi echo "Stopping download process..." echo "Session: $SESSION_ID" echo "PID: $PID" if [ "$FORCE" = "--force" ]; then # Force kill kill -9 "$PID" 2>/dev/null echo "✅ Force killed process $PID" else # Graceful kill kill "$PID" 2>/dev/null sleep 2 # Check if still running if kill -0 "$PID" 2>/dev/null; then echo "Process still running, forcing kill..." kill -9 "$PID" 2>/dev/null fi echo "✅ Process stopped" fi ``` ### Technical Analysis The script trusts a PID read from a file under the shared `/tmp` directory. It does not validate that the file was created by the download script, that its contents are a positive decimal PID, or that the referenced process is the expected `yt-dlp` process belonging to the recorded session. The caller also controls `SESSION_ID`, which determines the PID file path. An attacker able to create or replace a corresponding file can insert the PID of an unrelated process. Negative process selectors are not rejected. For example, a PID value of `-1` can cause the shell's `kill` command to signal all processes that the executing account is permitted to signal. The `kill -0` check only establishes that a signalable matching process or process set exists. It does not establish ownership by this skill or bind the PID to the original proc ...[truncated 1753 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
/stat`. - Executable path or command identity. - Owning user. 6. Refuse to terminate the process if any recorded identity attribute differs. 7. Create state files atomically and reject symbolic links. 8. Run the skill as a dedicated, unprivileged account and never as root. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/download.sh:7
Finding

Predictable Files in Shared Temporary Directory Enable Symlink Overwrite and Session Tampering

Content
View full analysis
"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 & # Save PID PID=$! echo $PID > "$PID_FILE" # Save session info cat > "$SESSION_FILE" <_. ``` The files are opened through ordinary shell redirection. Shell redirection follows existing symbolic links and truncates the linked target where permissions allow. No private session directory, exclusive file creation, symbolic-link rejection, or restrictive `umask` is used. A local attacker who predicts the timestamp and PID, observes process creation patterns, or pre-creates a range of likely names can place symbolic links at the expected paths. When the download starts, the script follows those links while writing the log, PID, and JSON session data. The same shared files are subsequently trusted by the status a ...[truncated 1754 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/download.sh:20
Finding

Sensitive Download URLs and Logs Are Stored in Shared Temporary Storage

Content
View full analysis
"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 & # Save PID PID=$! echo $PID > "$PID_FILE" # Save session info cat > "$SESSION_FILE" <
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises FaaS/Firecracker-style isolation, but the documentation only shows direct host-side background execution and references isolation without demonstrating or enforcing it. This can mislead operators into treating untrusted video downloads as sandboxed when they may actually run yt-dlp and related tooling on the host, increasing exposure to parser bugs, unsafe post-processing, or operational misuse; the missing status/kill implementation also indicates the documented security/management model is incomplete.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/download.sh (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

sh
PID_FILE="/tmp/${SESSION_NAME}.pid"
LOG_FILE="/tmp/${SESSION_NAME}.log"

# Start download in background with nohup
# Force MP4 output format
nohup yt-dlp \
    --no-warnings \

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/download.sh (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

sh
PID_FILE="/tmp/${SESSION_NAME}.pid"
LOG_FILE="/tmp/${SESSION_NAME}.log"

# Start download in background with nohup
# Force MP4 output format
nohup yt-dlp \
    --no-warnings \

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

This shell script deletes the session, PID, and log files after reporting a completed download. Although the cleanup is visible in code, there is no user-facing warning, confirmation, or explanatory comment indicating that checking status of a completed session will also remove tracking artifacts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.