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Security audit

Mixpost

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward Mixpost API reference that uses a user-provided Mixpost token to manage social media content, with no hidden code or persistence.

Install only if you intend to let the agent operate your Mixpost workspace. Use the least-privileged Mixpost token available, confirm the configured MIXPOST_URL is your own instance, and review any create, publish, approve, schedule, or delete action before it is run.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 15)May include surrounding context.

md
## Setup

1. Navigate to your Mixpost dashboard
2. Click on **Access Tokens** from the user menu
3. Click **Create** to generate a new token
4. Get your workspace UUID: Go to **Social Accounts** page, click the **3 dots menu** on any account, and copy the workspace UUID
5. Set environment variables:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

Test Connection

bash
curl -X GET "$MIXPOST_URL/api/ping" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $MIXPOST_ACCESS_TOKEN" \
  -H "Accept: application/json"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 297)May include surrounding context.

Update a post

bash
curl -X PUT "$MIXPOST_URL/api/$MIXPOST_WORKSPACE_UUID/posts/:postUuid" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $MIXPOST_ACCESS_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Accept: application/json" \

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This markdown file includes examples for deleting posts, deleting multiple posts, deleting tags, and deleting media, including an option to delete posts from both the app and social media platforms. While the endpoints are described functionally, the documentation does not include a clear warning that these actions may be destructive or irreversible and could remove user content from connected platforms.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.