T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
README.md:34- Finding
Unpinned and Inconsistent Installation Sources
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
README.md:34andREADME.md:41
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk through mutable and inconsistent installation sources
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
At
README.md:34:bash npx clawhub@latest install medical-mindmapAt
README.md:41:bash git clone https://github.com/your-github/medical-mindmap.gitThe repository URL at
README.md:41is inconsistent with the canonical homepage declared at_meta.json:9:json "homepage": "https://github.com/languang/medical-mindmap",Technical Analysis
The recommended
npx clawhub@latestcommand retrieves and executes a mutable package release. The documentation does not pin a reviewed version, specify an integrity hash, or require signature verification. Consequently, the code executed during installation can differ from the code that was audited if the upstream package, publishing account, or distribution channel is compromised.The alternative installation command uses the placeholder repository path
your-github/medical-mindmap, which does not match the repository declared in project metadata. This inconsistency can direct users to an unintended repository or facilitate repository-name confusion and social-engineering attacks.The project’s runtime script does not itself retrieve or execute remote payloads. The risk arises specifically from the documented installation process and therefore best matches an insecure dependency and supply-chain weakness.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the upstream package publisher, publishing credentials, distribution account, or mutable
latestrelease. - Alternatively, an attacker creates or controls a repository corresponding to the placeholder or otherwise misleading clone URL.
- A user follows one of the installation commands from the README.
- The mutable installer downloads attacker-controlled content, or the user clones the unintended repository.
- Installatio ...[truncated 1025 chars]
- An attacker compromises the upstream package publisher, publishing credentials, distribution account, or mutable
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
-
Replace
@latestwith a specifically reviewed and approved version:bash npx clawhub@1.2.3 install medical-mindmap -
Where supported, publish and verify package integrity hashes or cryptographic signatures before execution.
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Document the expected package publisher, package identifier, version, and checksum so users can verify provenance.
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Replace the placeholder clone URL with the canonical repository URL from project metadata:
bash git clone https://github.com/languang/medical-mindmap.git -
Recommend checking out a reviewed immutable tag or commit rather than the repository’s mutable default branch:
bash git clone https://github.com/languang/medical-mindmap.git cd medical-mindmap git checkout <reviewed-commit-hash> -
Ensure release tags are protected and, preferably, cryptographically signed.
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Avoid running installation commands with administrator or root privileges.
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Add automated documentation checks to ensure repository URLs and package metadata remain consistent.
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