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Security audit

Configure Telerik NuGet

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill configures the Telerik NuGet feed as described, but it persistently stores your Telerik API key in a user-wide environment variable.

Review before installing if you are not comfortable with your Telerik API key being saved persistently for your whole user profile. Prefer a process-scoped environment variable, a secure credential store, or a version that requires explicit opt-in and provides cleanup guidance for removing or rotating the key.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:32
Finding

Persistent Plaintext Storage of Telerik API Key in User Environment

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 32–34
Vulnerability Type: Persistent plaintext secret exposure
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

powershell
# Store API key as a user-level environment variable so it is available globally
[Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable($ApiKeyEnvVarName, $ApiKey, "User")
$env:$ApiKeyEnvVarName = $ApiKey

Technical Analysis

The function stores the supplied Telerik API key in a persistent user-level environment variable and also exposes it in the current PowerShell process environment. Environment variables are not secure secret stores. The persistent value may be stored without cryptographic protection by the operating system, while the process-level value can be inherited by child processes or exposed through diagnostics and process dumps.

Persisting the credential globally also exceeds the scope required to configure a single repository. Although the generated nuget.config contains only an environment-variable reference rather than the literal key, the underlying secret remains available outside the repository and across sessions.

Attack Path

  1. A user invokes Configure-TelerikNuGetSource with a valid Telerik API key.
  2. The function writes the key to a persistent user-level environment variable.
  3. The function also inserts the key into the current PowerShell process environment.
  4. An unrelated, compromised, or malicious process running under the same user context reads the persistent value, inherits the process environment, or obtains it from diagnostic artifacts.
  5. The attacker reuses the exposed key to authenticate to the Telerik NuGet service within the permissions assigned to that key.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation may disclose the Telerik API key to code running in the affected user's security context. An attacker could use the credential to access Telerik package-feed resources authorized by the key. The ...[truncated 386 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Do not persist the API key as a user-level environment variable.
  • Prefer a supported NuGet credential provider or an operating-system-backed secret store, such as Windows Credential Manager, macOS Keychain, or an appropriate Linux secret service.
  • If environment-variable authentication is required, require callers or the CI platform to inject the key only into the process that needs it.
  • Remove the call to [Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable(..., "User") and avoid copying the secret into broader process environments than necessary.
  • Ensure child processes that do not require package-feed access cannot inherit the credential.
  • Document credential rotation and revocation procedures, and advise users to rotate any key previously persisted by this function.
  • Apply least privilege to the Telerik credential and restrict its account permissions to the minimum package-feed access required.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill description says it manages Telerik NuGet feeds in a repo-local nuget.config, but the implementation also persists the API key as a user-level environment variable, expanding the scope of secret storage beyond the repo and beyond what a user would reasonably expect from the description. Persisting a secret globally increases exposure to other local processes, shells, and future sessions, and creates a hidden side effect that can outlive the immediate task.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The code explicitly stores the Telerik API key in a user-level environment variable via SetEnvironmentVariable(..., "User"), making the secret persist across sessions and potentially accessible to other software running as the same user. In the context of a skill meant to configure a repository NuGet source, this is broader access than necessary and increases the blast radius if the workstation, profile, or environment is inspected or abused.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.