Crawl4ai Skill

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 11, 2026 · 3:08 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.10

Overview

This skill is a straightforward web crawling/search wrapper, with expected network crawling behavior and no evidence of hidden persistence, credential handling, or destructive actions.

Install and run this in a virtual environment or container when possible, avoid elevated privileges, and apply normal scraping controls: respect site terms, robots.txt, privacy boundaries, copyright, and conservative rate/page limits. Consider pinning a reviewed package version before production use.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:51

Finding

Unpinned and Unaudited Third-Party Package Installation

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 51–55
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency installation
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

markdown

### Installation

```bash
pip install crawl4ai-skill

text

### Technical Analysis

The Skill contains no local implementation of its declared crawling functionality. Instead, it directs users or agents to install an external PyPI package without specifying an audited version, package hash, lock file, or trusted artifact digest.

Because `pip` resolves the current package release and its transitive dependencies at installation time, the code ultimately executed may differ from the version present when this Skill was reviewed. Python package installation may also execute package-controlled build logic. Subsequent invocation of the installed CLI executes code that is not included in the audited project.

This does not establish that the named package is malicious. It creates a supply-chain exposure in which a compromised publisher account, malicious future release, dependency compromise, or unsafe package source could turn the documented installation step into arbitrary code execution.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the package publisher account, distribution process, or one of the package's transitive dependencies.
2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under the expected package name.
3. A user or agent follows the Skill's unpinned `pip install crawl4ai-skill` instruction.
4. `pip` resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled release or dependency.
5. Malicious code executes during package build or installation, or when the documented CLI is invoked.
6. The payload operates with the privileges and environmental access of the user running `pip` or the installed command.

### Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution under the installing user's account. De
...[truncated 651 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Pin the dependency to a specific version that has been independently reviewed, for example crawl4ai-skill==<audited-version>.
2. Distribute a lock file or constraints file covering all transitive dependencies.
3. Require cryptographic hash verification, such as installation with pip --require-hashes.
4. Verify that the artifact digest corresponds exactly to the source revision that underwent review.
5. Install and run the crawler in an isolated virtual environment or container with a non-privileged account.
6. Restrict filesystem, credential, and network access to the minimum required for crawling.
7. Avoid administrator or root installation and execution.
8. Include reviewable source code in the Skill or provide a reproducible-build process linking the pinned source revision to the published package.
9. Periodically audit the pinned package and its transitive dependency tree before upgrading.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 91% confidence

Finding

The skill enables web search, single-page scraping, dynamic page rendering, and multi-page crawling, but provides no warning about legal restrictions, privacy implications, robots/terms-of-service compliance, rate limiting, or resource usage. This omission can lead users or downstream agents to collect sensitive data, hit sites aggressively, or scrape prohibited content without realizing the operational and compliance risks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.