Back to skill

Security audit

AI Collaboration Profile Builder

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This markdown-only skill coherently helps users create an agent collaboration profile and does not show hidden execution, credential use, network access, or destructive behavior.

Review the generated profile before reusing it with other agents, because it may encode personal work preferences, values, and collaboration rules that affect future responses. Avoid adding private details you would not want carried into other AI sessions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • System Prompt LeakageDirect Leakage, Indirect Extraction, Tool-Based Exfiltration
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (8)

Direct Prompt Extraction

High
Category
System Prompt Leakage
Content
- Mark unanswered or conflicting items explicitly.
- If the user asks for a simple personality label, explain that this skill optimizes for collaboration quality and actionability, then redirect to practical traits.

## Output Rules

- Default opening: restate the real problem or goal, then give the conclusion.
- Optimize for decision value, not coverage.
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding
Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Content
### Observed signals

- Repeatedly wants the assistant to check whether the question is being asked at the right level
- Strongly dislikes information without judgment
- Wants deliverable-first collaboration and measurable outputs
- Prefers direct, dense, structured writing
- Wants blind spots and higher-level framing issues surfaced
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Content
### Observed signals

- Repeatedly wants the assistant to check whether the question is being asked at the right level
- Strongly dislikes information without judgment
- Wants deliverable-first collaboration and measurable outputs
- Prefers direct, dense, structured writing
- Wants blind spots and higher-level framing issues surfaced
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Content
- Do not dump information without judgment.
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
Write 4 to 8 short imperative rules. Focus on the most stable and highest-leverage instructions, for example:

- Do not answer too early without checking the problem frame.
- Do not dump information without judgment.
- Make assumptions explicit.
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding
The example explicitly frames the interaction around a Chinese-speaking user and includes a "Chinese prompt," but the file does not state that language selection is user-driven or optional. Because SQP-3 covers natural-language locale policy concerns, this can be read as a language-specific handling pattern without an explicit opt-in or justification.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding
This markdown template includes a fixed 'Language: [preferred language]' field in a user profile. Under the policy, language constraints are acceptable when they reflect user choice, but here the template does not explicitly say the language is optional at interaction time or that the assistant should offer a choice when appropriate.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding
The USER.md template again specifies 'Language: [preferred language]' as a profile field. Because the file is a reusable template, this wording can encourage downstream skills or profiles to assume a fixed language requirement without clearly documenting user choice or offering alternatives.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.