T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:64- Finding
Unpinned Remote Installer Scripts Are Downloaded and Executed Directly
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Locations:
SKILL.md:64SKILL.md:69README.md:30README.md:35README-CN.md:29README-CN.md:34
Vulnerability Type: Unverified remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: HighComplete Vulnerable Code Snippet:
bash # Shell installation method for Linux and macOS curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/laiye-ai/adp-cli/main/scripts/adp-init.sh | bashpowershell # PowerShell installation method for Windows irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/laiye-ai/adp-cli/main/scripts/adp-init.ps1 | iexTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions retrieve scripts from the mutable
mainbranch of an external GitHub repository and immediately execute the responses usingbashor PowerShellInvoke-Expression.The downloaded scripts are not included in the audited project. Consequently, their effective behavior cannot be determined from this project and may change after the Skill has been reviewed. The instructions do not:
- Pin the script to an immutable commit or signed release.
- Verify a cryptographic signature.
- Validate a published checksum.
- Save the script for inspection before execution.
- Restrict execution through a sandbox or reduced-privilege account.
HTTPS protects the transport connection but does not protect against malicious or unauthorized changes made at the upstream repository. Compromise of the repository, maintainer account, branch, or release process could replace the installer with an arbitrary payload.
The upstream location is presented as the vendor's official CLI repository, and no evidence in the audited files proves that it currently serves a malicious script. Nevertheless, directly executing mutable remote content creates a remote code execution channel and is not necessary for the Skill's declared document-recognition functionality.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromise ...[truncated 1527 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove all pipe-to-shell and download-to-
Invoke-Expressioninstallation instructions. - Publish installers as versioned release artifacts rather than retrieving them from a mutable branch.
- Pin each download to a reviewed, immutable version or commit.
- Publish SHA-256 or stronger checksums through an independently protected release channel and require users to verify them before execution.
- Cryptographically sign release artifacts and document signature verification using a pinned signing identity.
- Download the installer to a local file first, verify its checksum and signature, and only then execute it.
- Prefer a version-pinned package-manager command or signed prebuilt binary. Avoid global installation where a project-local installation is sufficient.
- Run installation and document processing under a dedicated, non-administrative account with access only to the required input and output directories.
- Update
SKILL.md,README.md, andREADME-CN.mdconsistently so no insecure fallback remains. - Document that driving-license files are transferred to an external cloud service and require explicit user authorization, appropriate data-retention controls, and compliance with applicable privacy and data-residency requirements.
- Remove all pipe-to-shell and download-to-
