T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
requirements.txt:1- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Permit Unreviewed Package Versions
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
requirements.txt:1-2
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk caused by mutable dependency constraints
Risk Level: Lowtext requests>=2.28.0 beautifulsoup4>=4.11.0The installation instructions invoking this file appear in
README.md:7-10andSKILL.md:73.Technical Analysis
Both dependencies specify only minimum versions and provide no upper bounds, lock file, or cryptographic hashes. Consequently, the documented installation command can resolve to package releases that did not exist when the Skill was audited.
The package names are legitimate and no malicious dependency was identified. The risk arises from non-reproducible dependency resolution: a future compromised, malicious, or incompatible release accepted by these constraints could be downloaded from the configured package index. Installation from a malicious source distribution may execute attacker-controlled build logic, while malicious installed package code may execute when
fetch_valuesider.pyimportsrequestsandbs4.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises a permitted future release of
requestsorbeautifulsoup4, or compromises the package index or dependency-resolution channel used by the operator. - The operator follows the documented
pip install -r requirements.txtinstruction. - Because the requirements accept any version at or above the stated minimum,
pipresolves and downloads the attacker-controlled release. - Malicious code executes during package build/installation or when the Skill imports the installed package.
- The payload operates with the privileges of the account running
pipor the Skill.
This attack requires an upstream package, package-index, or dependency-distribution compromise; no direct exploitation path exists solely through ordinary Skill input.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could allow arbitrary code execution under t ...[truncated 439 chars]
- An attacker compromises a permitted future release of
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin each dependency to a reviewed exact version rather than using lower-bound-only constraints.
- Generate and commit a lock file containing all transitive dependencies.
- Record and enforce package hashes, such as by using
pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt. - Obtain packages only from a trusted, explicitly configured package index over TLS.
- Use automated dependency monitoring and update pins only after reviewing release notes and security advisories.
- Install dependencies in an isolated virtual environment with an unprivileged account.
- Avoid running the documented installation command as
rootor with administrative privileges.