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Security audit

Linked List Practice Helper 2

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a simple guidance-only skill for linked-list practice content, with overly broad auto-activation cues but no executable, persistence, credential, or data-exfiltration behavior.

Before installing, consider narrowing the trigger keywords or disabling implicit invocation so this skill only activates for linked-list interview-practice requests. The inspected package does not contain executable behavior or hidden data access.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill description includes very broad activation cues such as 'general-help', 'feat', and 'needs a practical workflow, artifact, checklist, analysis, or implementation support,' which can match many unrelated requests. This creates a prompt-routing risk where the skill may activate outside its intended linked-list scope, causing inappropriate instruction injection into unrelated tasks and weakening least-privilege behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The trigger list contains generic single words like 'feat', 'add', 'frequently', 'asked', and 'linked', which are too vague to safely determine intent. Such terms can cause accidental activation on unrelated conversations, expanding the skill's influence beyond its intended purpose and increasing the chance of misrouting or context pollution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill enables implicit invocation via allow_implicit_invocation: true while only providing broad, generic trigger language in metadata. This can cause the agent to auto-select the skill for loosely related requests, expanding its execution surface and increasing the chance of prompt-injection, unintended routing, or user actions being influenced without explicit consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger sentences and keywords are broad enough to match ordinary user requests such as general help, practical workflow, or feature assistance, which can cause the skill to activate outside its intended scope. Over-broad activation increases the chance of prompt/skill routing hijack, where this skill intercepts unrelated conversations and injects irrelevant or misleading workflow guidance.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.