other
- Location
hooks/hooks.json:3- Finding
Unconditional External Network Requests at Every Agent Session Start
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is openly designed to find movie torrents and magnet links, but it also runs network checks automatically, gives unsafe API-key setup advice, and makes an inaccurate privacy claim about third-party data sharing.
Review this skill carefully before installing. It is not a hidden malware package based on the inspected files, but it automatically contacts torrent-related sites on session start, sends movie-search interests to multiple third parties, and encourages risky API-key handling. Only use it in an environment where torrent-site access is acceptable, avoid pasting API keys into chat, and assume searches may be visible to the contacted services and network monitors.
hooks/hooks.json:3Unconditional External Network Requests at Every Agent Session Start
SKILL.md:253Privacy Disclosure Contradicts Transmission of User-Derived Search Data
SKILL.md:95TMDb API Key Embedded in URL Query Parameters
README.md:128Documentation Encourages Users to Paste API Keys into Agent Conversations
Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.
**Manual setup:**
- Claude Code: Add to `.claude/settings.json` or `~/.claude/settings.json`:
```json
{ "env": { "TORRENTCLAW_API_KEY": "your-key-here" } }
Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.
**Manual setup:**
- Claude Code: Add to `.claude/settings.json` or `~/.claude/settings.json`:
```json
{ "env": { "TORRENTCLAW_API_KEY": "your-key-here" } }
The skill advertises multi-platform trending aggregation and real-time verification of downloadable resources, but the documented behavior does not substantiate those claims and appears to rely on simpler search and seeder-count heuristics. This is dangerous because users may trust inaccurate provenance and availability claims, which can mislead them into downloading low-quality, fake, or infringing content under false assurances.
The skill claims it does not send user data to third parties, yet its normal workflow transmits user-provided movie queries to external services such as WebSearch, TMDb, subtitle sites, and torrent-related sources. This is dangerous because it creates a privacy and transparency failure: users may disclose preferences or sensitive queries believing they stay local when they are actually shared externally.
The skill uses 'env' capability that is not listed in its permissions. This may indicate deceptive intent or missing permission declarations.
The trigger phrases are broad and overlap with normal entertainment queries such as '最近有什么好看的' or 'recommend movie', which can cause the skill to activate unexpectedly in unrelated conversations. In this skill's context, unexpected activation is more dangerous because the skill is specifically designed to locate torrents and magnet links, potentially steering benign movie chats into piracy-oriented behavior.
The README instructs users to paste API keys into chat for automatic configuration without warning that secrets shared in conversation may be logged, exposed to the model, or mishandled by the agent. This creates unnecessary secret-exposure risk, especially in an agent environment where chat content may be retained or used to trigger additional actions.
The README uses role-play framing ('Even if you tell ChatGPT you're an FBI agent...') to discuss bypassing or working around another model's safety restrictions. Even though it is presented as commentary, this normalizes safety-evasion tactics and encourages users to seek models that will comply with torrent and magnet-link requests the safer model would reject.
The README tells users to paste a live API key directly into an AI assistant for configuration. That normalizes disclosure of credentials to the model/runtime, which may persist in logs, chat history, telemetry, or downstream tool calls, creating avoidable secret-exposure risk.
Instructing users to reveal API keys directly to the AI assistant for setup is a direct secret-handling anti-pattern. Secrets disclosed in chat may be retained in transcripts, visible to plugins/tools, or exposed to other users/processes depending on the platform, making later misuse possible.
This repeats the same unsafe pattern for a second credential, encouraging users to disclose a TMDb API key to the assistant. Repetition increases the chance users will treat secret-sharing with the agent as standard practice, expanding accidental credential leakage risk.
This second instruction repeats the same disclosure pattern for another API key, reinforcing unsafe operational behavior. Even if the referenced API is low sensitivity, teaching users to hand secrets to the assistant increases broader credential-exposure risk across the environment.
The README uses role-play framing about being an 'FBI agent' to illustrate bypassing another model's safety restrictions for torrent/magnet-link assistance. This is dangerous because it explicitly normalizes evasion of model safeguards and signals that the skill's intended use includes obtaining potentially infringing download resources.
The trigger phrases are very broad and overlap with ordinary movie-chat intents like '最近有什么好看的' or 'trending', increasing the chance the skill activates when a user only wants benign recommendations. In this context, accidental invocation is more dangerous because the skill's default behavior reaches torrent, subtitle, and scraping services tied to piracy-oriented workflows.
The instructions state that non-English titles must not be translated directly and instead require querying for the exact English title. This imposes an English-centric workflow without user opt-in or a clearly documented locale-specific justification, which can violate language/locale policy expectations.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
增强版(有 TMDB_API_KEY 时):
curl -s "https://api.themoviedb.org/3/search/movie?api_key=$TMDB_API_KEY&query=英文片名&year=年份&language=zh-CN"
基础版:直接用 Step 1.5 的 WebSearch 结果,里面已包含电影信息。
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
增强版(有 TMDB_API_KEY 时):
curl -s "https://api.themoviedb.org/3/search/movie?api_key=$TMDB_API_KEY&query=英文片名&year=年份&language=zh-CN"
基础版:直接用 Step 1.5 的 WebSearch 结果,里面已包含电影信息。
The manifest frames the skill as a movie download-resource search and recommendation tool, but the workflow also performs subtitle searching and review scraping by default. Undisclosed auxiliary behaviors matter because they expand the data flow and external interaction surface beyond what users and operators may reasonably expect.
The evals validate broad behavior for finding magnet links, torrents, and downloadable copies across multiple sources with no trigger restrictions, policy exclusions, or consent checks. In context, this skill is specifically designed to locate download resources for movies, which increases the likelihood of facilitating copyright infringement, unsafe file acquisition, and expansion into abuse-prone search behavior.
The evals expand the skill from movie torrent/magnet discovery into subtitle search, which is a capability increase beyond the stated purpose. Scope drift matters in agent skills because it can introduce unreviewed behaviors, additional external domains, and different legal/compliance risks without corresponding manifest disclosures or guardrails.
This skill registers a SessionStart hook that automatically executes a local Python script whenever a session begins. Auto-executing bundled code on lifecycle events expands the attack surface because users may trigger code execution without explicit intent, and in this skill's context the functionality is aimed at locating movie download resources, which makes hidden or background behavior less expected and harder to justify.
The empty matcher causes the SessionStart hook to activate unconditionally for every session, making the bundled command run far more broadly than needed. This increases the likelihood of unintended execution, reduces user control, and can be abused to run code in contexts unrelated to the skill's stated purpose.
This code contains hard-coded Chinese-language labels and descriptions in comments and user-facing strings, such as '轻量版', '发烧版', and '均衡版'. The file does not indicate any user opt-in, locale selection, or region-specific justification, which violates the language/locale policy criterion.
This script sends user search terms to multiple external torrent indexers and an optional third-party API, but the CLI does not clearly warn the user that their query and metadata may be transmitted to several untrusted services. In this skill’s context, the searches concern torrent and magnet-link discovery, which increases privacy, legal, and operational risk because user interest data is exposed to piracy-oriented sites and aggregators.
The text states the skill is designed for Claude and strongly discourages other providers, culminating in language that Claude 'will' execute the instructions as intended. This is a natural-language policy concern because it forces a specific platform preference without presenting it as user choice or a neutral compatibility note.
No suspicious patterns detected.