T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
scripts/patch-config.js:252- Finding
Global Session Visibility Exposes Unrelated Agent Conversations
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a coherent multi-agent orchestration kit, but it grants broad cross-session visibility and command authority and has an installer path-scoping weakness that users should review before installing.
Install only if you are comfortable with this kit changing OpenClaw configuration, creating persistent agent workspaces, enabling heartbeat-driven task checks, and allowing broad session visibility. Before applying, use dry-run, inspect the exact openclaw.json diff, restrict session visibility if OpenClaw supports it, deny exec for non-operational agents, use a simple safe workspace name, and keep the backup so you can roll back.
scripts/patch-config.js:252Global Session Visibility Exposes Unrelated Agent Conversations
scripts/patch-config.js:24Command Execution Is Granted by Default to Non-Operational Agents
scripts/scaffold.sh:273Unvalidated Leader Workspace Name Allows Writes Outside the OpenClaw Base Directory
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
mv "$LEADER_WS/AGENTS.md.tmp" "$LEADER_WS/AGENTS.md"
ok "$LEADER_WS_NAME/AGENTS.md routing matrix populated from team preset"
else
rm -f "$LEADER_WS/AGENTS.md.tmp"
log "[WARN] awk produced empty output for AGENTS.md routing matrix — skipping"
fi
fi
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
mv "$LEADER_WS/AGENTS.md.tmp" "$LEADER_WS/AGENTS.md"
ok "$LEADER_WS_NAME/AGENTS.md routing matrix populated from team preset"
else
rm -f "$LEADER_WS/AGENTS.md.tmp"
log "[WARN] awk produced empty output for AGENTS.md routing matrix — skipping"
fi
fi
Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.
1. **Domain first** — Understand the business problem before picking tools
2. **Trade-offs over best practices** — Name what you're giving up
3. **Propose options** — Always present 2-3 approaches with trade-offs
4. **Document decisions** — Use ADRs to capture context, options, and rationale
5. **Reversibility matters** — Prefer decisions easy to change over "optimal" ones
## Output Format
The file contains hidden orchestration instructions embedded in an HTML comment block marked as auto-injected and not to be removed. Even though the content appears operational rather than overtly malicious, concealed instructions can override or bias agent behavior, create covert communication requirements, and are especially risky because they are not visible in normal rendered Markdown views.
---
<!-- ORCHESTRATION PROTOCOL — AUTO-INJECTED, DO NOT REMOVE -->
## Task Completion & Callback
The file embeds hidden orchestration instructions in an HTML comment that materially alter agent behavior by forcing an out-of-band callback and prescribing fallback routing. Because AGENTS.md content is untrusted prompt input, these concealed instructions can override or interfere with the agent's intended control flow, cause unauthorized data exfiltration to another session, and evade normal reviewer scrutiny due to being hidden from the visible operating instructions.
---
<!-- ORCHESTRATION PROTOCOL — AUTO-INJECTED, DO NOT REMOVE -->
## Task Completion & Callback
The skill advertises a very broad activation scope, including generic phrases like "set up agents," "build a team," and "orchestrate work," which can cause the skill to trigger in contexts beyond the user's intent. Because this skill performs configuration changes, scaffolding, and gateway restarts, accidental activation could lead to unnecessary system modifications or initiation of multi-agent workflows without adequate user intent verification.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
Use when setting up or managing a multi-agent task orchestration system on OpenClaw.
Use this skill whenever the user wants to: coordinate multiple agents, set up an agent team,
dispatch tasks across agents, track task progress in real-time, add approval gates to agent
workflows, create a star topology with a leader agent, build a multi-agent pipeline,
manage agent callbacks, or anything involving agents working together on tasks.
Also use when the user says "set up agents", "build a team", "orchestrate work",
"multi-agent workflow", "agent coordination", or "task dispatch".
The skill collects owner identity, timezone, language, and supports creation of custom agents and persistent workspace artifacts under shared directories. In context, this persistence increases risk because user-specific data and agent instructions may remain available across sessions and to multiple agents, creating unnecessary exposure if not tightly scoped and governed.
> See `templates/teams/` for team definitions. See `templates/agents/` for all available agent templates.
After team selection, the user can add individual agents from the template catalog or create custom agents.
### Step 3: Instance Configuration
Post-setup flows can create new workspaces, inject orchestration rules, update openclaw.json, and restart the gateway, all of which establish durable state across future sessions. In a multi-agent environment, persistent configuration changes and agent registration expand attack surface and can outlive the initiating request, making misuse or accidental persistence materially dangerous.
Say: "Add a Senior Developer agent" or "Add a Researcher to the team"
The kit will:
1. Create workspace from template
2. Inject orchestration rules
3. Update `openclaw.json`
4. Restart gateway
The documentation explicitly allows customization of "auto-approve rules," which creates a path for actions to proceed without explicit owner authorization. That directly weakens the stated approval gate and can enable external execution or sensitive workflow continuation based on inferred or preconfigured approval rather than fresh human consent.
See `references/approval-workflow.md` for the full pipeline. Key customization points:
- Approval shortcuts (what phrases count as "approve")
- Stale approval timeout (default: 48h)
- Auto-approve rules (if any)
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
- Make product decisions — that's Leader's job
- Communicate with the owner — only Leader does that
- Push, deploy, or take external actions without approval
## Safety
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
- Make product decisions — that's Leader's job
- Communicate with the owner — only Leader does that
- Push, deploy, or take external actions without approval
## Safety
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
## Safety
- Never run destructive commands without checking the brief permits it
- `trash` > `rm` when possible
- Verify paths before modifying files
- Report unexpected states rather than working around them
Lines L37-L42 state the Leader 'don't produce or operate' and should delegate heavy operations, implying a coordination-only role. But lines L61-L65 explicitly say it is safe for the Leader to read files, use web_search/web_fetch, and work within the workspace, which contradicts the earlier role constraint by authorizing direct operational actions.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
## Safety
- Don't exfiltrate private data. Ever.
- Don't run destructive commands without asking.
- `trash` > `rm` (recoverable beats gone forever)
- When in doubt, ask.
Setting 'Agent-to-agent language: English' is a natural-language policy choice that forces a specific language. The file does not offer opt-in/opt-out, user selection, or a region/compliance justification for this constraint.
Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.
Execution Boundary:
### Reviewer (on-demand, spawned)
The file states it is the 'single source of truth' and that 'Agents read this' to determine behavior, but it does not define any trigger scope, exclusions, or which agents should consume it under what conditions. In a shared template, that ambiguity can lead to unintended broad application of the settings.