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Security audit

虾皮市场风格轮动分析

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This market-analysis skill is coherent, but it asks users to run a mutable npm CLI and handle API tokens in ways that could expose credentials.

Review this skill before installing. Use it only if you trust the DaxiAPI CLI source, prefer a pinned reviewed CLI version instead of @latest, avoid entering real tokens directly on the command line, and do not let the agent print or store token values in logs or chat context.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:35
Finding

Execution of an Unpinned Third-Party Package Through npx

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:35-45; additional occurrences in references/cli-commands.md:10, 58-78, 105-111 and references/token-setup.md:67-83, 107
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned runtime dependency and software supply-chain exposure
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

bash
npx daxiapi-cli@latest config get token
# If it is not configured:
npx daxiapi-cli@latest config set token YOUR_TOKEN
bash
npx daxiapi-cli@latest market style

Technical Analysis

The documentation repeatedly instructs the Agent to execute daxiapi-cli@latest through npx. The latest tag is mutable and does not identify a fixed, previously audited package version. Depending on the local npm cache and configuration, npx can download the current package release and execute its code, including applicable package lifecycle behavior, with the permissions of the invoking user.

The project does not pin an exact version, provide a lockfile, verify a package integrity hash, or identify a trusted package release. Consequently, the code ultimately executed can change after this Skill has been reviewed. A compromised publisher account, malicious package update, or upstream package compromise could turn the documented command into an arbitrary code-execution path.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the npm publisher account or upstream package distribution process for daxiapi-cli.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious release and assigns it to the latest npm tag.
  3. A user or Agent follows the Skill and runs npx daxiapi-cli@latest.
  4. npx retrieves and executes the malicious release.
  5. The package executes under the user's account and can access resources available to that account.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running the Agent. The effective scope may include reading or modifyi ...[truncated 317 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Replace daxiapi-cli@latest with an exact, reviewed version such as daxiapi-cli@X.Y.Z.
  • Record and verify the package integrity hash using a lockfile or another reproducible dependency-verification mechanism.
  • Document the official npm package URL, expected publisher identity, and trusted release source.
  • Review package lifecycle scripts and package contents before allowing execution.
  • Prefer installing dependencies in an isolated, least-privileged environment rather than downloading and executing them during each Skill invocation.
  • Establish a controlled upgrade process in which new versions are reviewed and tested before the pinned version is changed.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:35
Finding

API Token May Be Exposed Through Token Retrieval Commands

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:35, 157; additional occurrences in references/cli-commands.md:70-78 and references/token-setup.md:67-76
Vulnerability Type: Sensitive credential disclosure through command output and logs
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

bash
npx daxiapi-cli@latest config get token
# If it is not configured:
npx daxiapi-cli@latest config set token YOUR_TOKEN

The troubleshooting guidance also instructs users to run:

bash
npx daxiapi-cli@latest config get token

Technical Analysis

The Skill recommends retrieving the configured token to determine whether authentication has been configured. If the CLI returns the token value rather than a redacted status, the credential may be exposed in terminal output, Agent execution traces, captured logs, conversation context, monitoring systems, or debugging records.

Verifying whether a secret exists does not require revealing its value. Secret-bearing output is particularly risky in Agent environments because command results may be retained or transmitted to orchestration and observability systems beyond the immediate terminal session.

Attack Path

  1. A user has a valid DaxiAPI token configured locally.
  2. The Agent follows the documented setup or troubleshooting procedure and runs config get token.
  3. The CLI prints the full token in its output.
  4. The output is retained in Agent context, command logs, terminal recordings, telemetry, or support artifacts.
  5. A party with access to those records recovers and uses the token without authorization.

Impact Assessment

Exposure could allow unauthorized API access within the permissions and quota assigned to the compromised token. An attacker may consume paid quota, retrieve data available to the account, interfere with normal service use, or cause account-level abuse. The direct privilege obtained is limited to the authorization grante ...[truncated 99 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Replace token-value retrieval with a status command that returns only whether a token is configured.
  • If retrieval is unavoidable, mask the value and reveal no more than a small non-sensitive prefix or suffix.
  • Explicitly instruct the Agent never to reproduce, summarize, store, or include token values in reports or conversation output.
  • Configure command logging and telemetry systems to redact the token and the DAXIAPI_TOKEN environment variable.
  • Avoid passing real token values as visible command-line arguments, because process inspection and command history can capture them.
  • Rotate the token immediately if it has appeared in logs or Agent output.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
references/token-setup.md:44
Finding

Persistent Plaintext Storage of API Tokens in User Configuration Files

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/token-setup.md:44-48; related persistent CLI configuration at references/token-setup.md:64-76
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext sensitive-data storage
Risk Level: Low

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

bash
# Temporary setting for the current terminal session
export DAXIAPI_TOKEN=YOUR_TOKEN_FROM_DAXIAPI

# Permanent setting by adding it to ~/.bashrc or ~/.zshrc
echo 'export DAXIAPI_TOKEN=YOUR_TOKEN_FROM_DAXIAPI' >> ~/.bashrc
source ~/.bashrc

The alternative configuration method also persistently stores the token:

bash
npx daxiapi-cli@latest config set token YOUR_TOKEN_FROM_DAXIAPI

npx daxiapi-cli@latest config get token

The documented configuration locations are:

text
Linux/macOS: ~/.daxiapirc
Windows: %USERPROFILE%\.daxiapirc

Technical Analysis

The documentation recommends writing a long-lived API token directly into a shell startup file or a CLI configuration file. These mechanisms commonly store values as plaintext. The guidance does not require owner-only file permissions, encryption, an operating-system credential store, or protection against accidental dotfile publication and backup exposure.

Shell startup files may also be copied into dotfile repositories, included in diagnostic archives, read by other processes running under the same account, or exposed through an overly permissive home-directory configuration. Supplying the token directly in a command can additionally place it in shell history.

Attack Path

  1. A user follows the permanent setup instructions and writes the token into ~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, or ~/.daxiapirc.
  2. The file remains stored in plaintext and is backed up, synchronized, committed to a dotfile repository, included in a support bundle, or read after a local account compromise.
  3. An attacker obtains the file or shell history containing the token.
  4. The attacker extracts the c ...[truncated 521 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Prefer session-scoped secret injection or an operating-system credential manager instead of shell startup files.
  • If file-based storage is unavoidable, create a dedicated configuration file with owner-only permissions, such as mode 0600 on Linux and macOS.
  • Do not include literal tokens in commands that may be retained in shell history.
  • Add explicit warnings against committing shell profiles, .daxiapirc, environment files, or token-bearing examples to source control.
  • Ensure backups and support bundles exclude or redact credential files.
  • Document token revocation and rotation procedures and recommend periodic rotation.
  • Ensure the CLI never prints the complete stored token and supports secure deletion of obsolete credentials.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
Findings (26)

YARA rule 'backdoor_persistence': Backdoor persistence with malicious payloads (shell commands, SSH key injection, hidden root users) [malware]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/token-setup.md (reported line 47)May include surrounding context.

��**:

  • Token 只显示一次,请妥善保存
  • 不要将 Token 分享给他人
  • Token 泄露可能导致账号风险

配置 Token

方式一:环境变量(推荐)

优点:临时有效,安全性较高

Linux/macOS:

bash
# 临时设置(当前终端会话有效)
export DAXIAPI_TOKEN=YOUR_TOKEN_FROM_DAXIAPI

# 永久设置(添加到 ~/.bashrc 或 ~/.zshrc)
echo 'export DAXIAPI_TOKEN=YOUR_TOKEN_FROM_DAXIAPI' >> ~/.bashrc
source ~/.bashrc

Windows:

cmd
# 临时设置(当前命令行会话有效)
set DAXIAPI_TOKEN=YOUR_TOKEN_FROM_DAXIAPI

# 永久设置(系统环境变量)
setx DAXIAPI_TOKEN "YOUR_TOKEN_FROM_DAXIAPI"

方式二:CLI 配置

优点:持久保存,无需每次设置

bash
# 设置 Token
npx daxiapi-cli@latest config set token YOUR_TOKEN_FROM_DAXIAPI

# 验证配置
npx daxiapi-cli@latest config get token

配置文件位置:

  • Linux/macOS: ~/.daxiapirc
  • Windows: `%USERPROFILE%.da

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/token-setup.md (reported line 134)May include surrounding context.

npx daxiapi-cli@latest config delete token

或手动删除配置文件

rm ~/.daxiapirc # Linux/macOS del %USERPROFILE%.daxiapirc # Windows

text

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The trigger list includes broad finance phrases like 沪深300, 中证2000, and 大盘小盘, which can appear in ordinary market discussion outside the narrow intended workflow. Over-broad invocation can cause the skill to activate unexpectedly, leading to unnecessary external data access, irrelevant automated analysis, or unintended execution of the skill's prescribed process.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes npx daxiapi-cli@latest, which fetches and executes whatever package version is current at runtime rather than a reviewed, fixed version. If the package is compromised, typosquatted, or publishes a malicious update, users may execute attacker-controlled code on their machine and expose local files, environment variables, or configured tokens.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This line again directs users to run npx daxiapi-cli@latest, causing unpinned remote code execution during token configuration. Because the command is used at the moment credentials are being handled, a malicious or swapped package version could capture the token immediately and send it to an attacker.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Using npx daxiapi-cli@latest market style means the analysis step depends on executing an unpinned package from the registry at runtime. In this skill context, that package is central to the workflow, so compromise would affect every user invocation and could alter outputs, exfiltrate credentials, or run arbitrary code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Even in troubleshooting guidance, recommending npx daxiapi-cli@latest normalizes repeated execution of an unpinned package. While this instance is less directly tied to credential entry than earlier lines, it still reinforces an unsafe supply-chain pattern that could lead users to execute unexpected code during support or recovery steps.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documentation instructs users to run npx daxiapi-cli@latest, which fetches and executes whatever code is currently published under that package name. Using @latest rather than a pinned, verified version creates a supply-chain execution risk if the package is compromised, a malicious version is published, or behavior changes unexpectedly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This example again uses npx daxiapi-cli@latest, causing users to execute remote package code without version pinning. In security terms this is a classic supply-chain risk because the command path encourages immediate execution of the newest published artifact.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The --output json example still relies on @latest, so it inherits the same untrusted code execution risk as the main command. Repetition across examples increases the likelihood that users will normalize insecure package execution patterns.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Redirecting output to a file does not reduce the risk of running npx ...@latest; the dangerous part is the package retrieval and execution step. A compromised package could still execute arbitrary code on the user's machine before producing the file.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The token setup guidance shows config set token YOUR_TOKEN_FROM_DAXIAPI directly on the command line without warning that secrets entered this way may be stored in shell history, exposed in process listings, or shown on-screen. Because this skill is about market data rather than security operations, users are less likely to anticipate credential-handling pitfalls, which increases practical risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Even the token inspection command uses npx ...@latest, meaning a user may run unpinned remote code in a context related to credential handling. That raises the danger because compromised code could exfiltrate configuration secrets or environment data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This command combines two risky behaviors: unpinned @latest execution and direct handling of an API token. If the package were malicious or compromised, it could immediately capture and exfiltrate the supplied token, making the impact more severe in this credential-sensitive context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The help command still teaches users to execute the newest published package without review. Although --help seems harmless, the package code must still be downloaded and run, so a malicious release can execute arbitrary actions before displaying help.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Requesting --version does not mitigate the underlying npx ...@latest execution risk. A user may incorrectly assume version display is safe, but the command still runs untrusted package code from the registry.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This help example repeats the unpinned @latest pattern and reinforces insecure execution habits throughout the document. In aggregate, repeated unsafe examples materially increase the chance of users running compromised or unexpected code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill tells users to configure an API token but does not disclose where the credential will be stored, how it will be used, or the risks of entering it into a downloaded CLI. In context, this becomes more sensitive because the same workflow also relies on npx ... @latest, so users are asked to provide credentials to code that may change between runs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

SQP-3 covers natural-language policy violations across all file types, including forcing a specific language without user opt-in. This file presents all instructions and examples only in Chinese and does not indicate that the skill is region-specific or provide an alternative language option.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The entire skill document is written only in Chinese and does not indicate that language selection is optional or that the skill is limited to a Chinese-language or China-specific audience. Under the policy, language constraints should either be user-selectable or explicitly justified as region-specific.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.