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Security audit

topos

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s code-analysis workflow, local indexing, and optional agent integrations are clearly disclosed and fit its purpose.

Review the remote installer before running it, and configure only the agent integrations you want. Expect local dependency-graph files, review proposed code changes, and run project tests; Topos scores do not prove correctness or security.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (3)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The supplied chunk performs installation and integration setup rather than code evaluation or improvement. Although setup can support the declared purpose, registering an MCP server across every supported harness is a materially broader configuration action not disclosed in the description. The status check is a supporting verification step, not an independent mismatch.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The installation command downloads a mutable remote script and immediately executes it without verifying a pinned version, signature, or independently trusted digest. Compromise of the distribution endpoint could therefore execute arbitrary commands with the invoking user's privileges, including accessing repository contents and credentials; HTTPS does not protect against a compromised publisher.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

Runtime dependencies:

bash
curl -fsSL https://docs.krv.ai/topos/install.sh | bash
npm install -g gitnexus   # enables COMPOSABLE / PLATINUM scoring

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Piping the HTTP response directly into bash turns externally supplied bytes into shell commands without an intervening verification step. This confirms the same unsafe installation mechanism reported by SC2, not a separate exploit or evidence of malicious tool chaining; its documented installation purpose explains the command but does not remove the risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

Runtime dependencies:

bash
curl -fsSL https://docs.krv.ai/topos/install.sh | bash
npm install -g gitnexus   # enables COMPOSABLE / PLATINUM scoring

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.