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Security audit

OTPly

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed email OTP API integration, but users should handle its account credentials and OTP data carefully.

Use this only if you intend to use ToolWeb's OTPLY service. Treat the account password, OTPs, token, API key, and API secret as sensitive credentials: avoid pasting production secrets into casual prompts, do not log them, rotate them if exposed, and confirm the service/provider is acceptable for the email addresses and verification flows you plan to process.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill documentation explicitly instructs users to transmit sensitive credentials (X-API-Key and X-API-Secret) and personal data such as email addresses and OTP values, but it provides no warning about secure handling, storage, logging, or minimization of that data. In an agent-skill context, this can lead to accidental secret exposure in prompts, logs, traces, screenshots, or third-party tooling, increasing the risk of account compromise and privacy violations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 248)May include surrounding context.

md
## References

- **Kong Route:** https://api.toolweb.in/tools/otply
- **API Docs:** https://api.toolweb.in:8168/docs

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The specification is presented as a simple email OTP service, but it also exposes account registration and login flows that issue long-lived authentication material (token, api_key, and api_secret). This expands the trust boundary and capability of the skill beyond its stated purpose, increasing the risk that an agent or user may unknowingly handle account credentials or trigger account lifecycle actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The API returns highly sensitive secrets in LoginResponse (token, api_key, api_secret) and requires secrets to be supplied in request headers for subsequent operations, yet the specification provides no warning about secret handling, storage, redaction, or consent. In an agent context, this creates a real risk of credential exfiltration via logs, transcripts, prompt context, or downstream tool calls, enabling full unauthorized use of the OTP service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.