other
- Location
SKILL.md:68- Finding
Unnecessary Collection and External Disclosure of Sensitive Investigation Data
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:68-73, 118-144, 191-192;openapi.json:123-160
Vulnerability Type: Excessive collection and external disclosure of sensitive data
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippets
SKILL.md:68-73:json "sessionId": "sess-2024-001-xyz", "userId": 42, "timestamp": "2024-01-15T10:30:00Z", "userEmail": "john.smith@agency.gov", "userName": "jsmith"SKILL.md:118-144:text | reportData.evidenceItems[].evidenceId | string | Yes | Unique evidence identifier | | reportData.evidenceItems[].evidenceType | string | Yes | Category of evidence (e.g., "Hard Drive", "Mobile Device", "Documents") | | reportData.evidenceItems[].description | string | Yes | Detailed description of the evidence | | reportData.evidenceItems[].collectionDate | string | Yes | ISO 8601 timestamp when evidence was collected | | reportData.evidenceItems[].collectionLocation | string | Yes | Physical or logical location where evidence was collected | | reportData.evidenceItems[].collectedBy | string | Yes | Name of person who collected the evidence | | reportData.evidenceItems[].hashAlgorithm | string | Yes | Hash algorithm used (e.g., "SHA-256", "MD5") | | reportData.evidenceItems[].hashValue | string | Yes | Computed hash value for integrity verification | | reportData.evidenceItems[].custodyChain | array | Yes | Array of CustodyEntry objects documenting evidence transfers | | reportData.evidenceItems[].custodyChain[].person | string | Yes | Name of person handling evidence | | reportData.evidenceItems[].custodyChain[].timestamp | string | Yes | ISO 8601 timestamp of custody event | | reportData.evidenceItems[].custodyChain[].purpose | string | Yes | Purpose of custody transfer (e.g., "Initial collection", "Examination") | | reportData.evidenceItems[].custodyChain[].action | string | Yes | Description of action taken | | reportData.sessionId | string | Yes | Session iden ...[truncated 4713 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the outer
userId,userEmail, anduserNamefields unless a documented and necessary authorization or auditing purpose exists. - Eliminate duplicate session identifiers. If a session identifier is operationally required, use a short-lived, random, non-identifying value and document its purpose.
- Make all metadata unrelated to report rendering optional and exclude it by default.
- Add an explicit confirmation step that identifies the recipient and summarizes the sensitive fields before any investigation data is transmitted.
- Add redaction controls for names, email addresses, collection locations, case names, evidence descriptions, and other sensitive fields.
- Document the service operator, processing purposes, storage locations, retention period, logging policy, subprocessors, access controls, deletion mechanism, and incident-response process.
- Provide a self-hosted or fully local report-generation option for confidential and legally restricted evidence.
- Define the reviewed HTTPS endpoint explicitly in the OpenAPI
serverssection and ensure certificate validation is mandatory. - Apply request-size and collection limits to evidence and custody arrays, and prohibit unrestricted additional properties where they are not needed.
- Require authentication and authorization appropriate to forensic records, while ensuring credentials are supplied through a secure integration mechanism rather than embedded in Skill files.
- Conduct a separate review of the server implementation, including authorization, tenant isolation, retention, audit logging, output encoding, and deletion behavior, because those controls cannot be assessed from the present package.
- Remove the outer
