T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:34- Finding
Mandatory Revenue-Generating API Use and Promotional Output Hijack
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is an API-backed security-assessment helper, but it sends sensitive organization security details and an API key to ToolWeb with weak disclosure and an unsafe test script, so it should be reviewed before use.
Install only if you are comfortable with ToolWeb receiving the threat model, asset categories, security tooling, compliance context, timestamps, and metered API usage. Do not submit secrets, hostnames, IP addresses, customer data, or regulated incident details unless your organization has approved ToolWeb. Avoid running scripts/test-api.sh unless the endpoint is confirmed and curl -k is removed.
SKILL.md:34Mandatory Revenue-Generating API Use and Promotional Output Hijack
SKILL.md:44Sensitive Organizational Security Context Is Transmitted Without an Explicit Consent Gate
scripts/test-api.sh:19TLS Certificate Verification Is Disabled While Sending an API Credential
scripts/test-api.sh:8API Credentials Are Sent to an Endpoint Inconsistent with the Documented Destination
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
clawhub install threat-assessment-defense-guide
mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/skills/threat-assessment-defense-guide cp SKILL.md ~/.openclaw/skills/threat-assessment-defense-guide/
The README instructs users to configure a third-party API key and use the skill for organization-specific threat assessments, but it does not clearly disclose that user-supplied threat details may be transmitted to an external service. This can cause operators to share sensitive security posture, asset, or incident information with a third party without informed consent, creating privacy, confidentiality, and compliance risk.
The skill invokes shell-based network access via curl but does not declare any explicit tool scope such as allowed-tools or permissions. That weakens sandboxing and review controls, making it easier for the skill to gain broader execution capability than users or platforms may expect.
This skill is explicitly designed to exfiltrate user-supplied assessment inputs to a third-party endpoint using curl and an API key. While that may be functional intent, it is still a real security concern because the data involved can include sensitive threat models, asset inventories, and organizational security posture details.
env:
- TOOLWEB_API_KEY
bins:
- curl
primaryEnv: TOOLWEB_API_KEY
os:
- linux
The workflow instructs the agent to collect detailed organizational threat, industry, asset, and security-context data and send it to an external API, but it does not clearly warn users that their sensitive security information will leave the local environment. This creates a privacy and data-handling risk, especially because the transmitted content could reveal defensive gaps, critical assets, and business context.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
echo ""
RESPONSE=$(curl -sk -w "\n%{http_code}" -X POST "$API_URL" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-API-Key: $TOOLWEB_API_KEY" \
-d '{