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Security audit

K8s Security Review

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Kubernetes manifest review skill appears purpose-aligned, but it can send complete manifests, including Secrets, to an external API without enough redaction or privacy guidance.

Review and redact manifests before use, especially Secret resources, tokens, private keys, passwords, internal hostnames, registry credentials, and sensitive annotations. Use only with data you are comfortable sending to the listed external service unless the publisher provides clear retention, logging, deletion, and privacy commitments.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:75
Finding

Unredacted Kubernetes Manifests May Be Disclosed to an External Service

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Privileged Kubernetes Workload

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

json
{
  "yaml_content": "apiVersion: v1\nkind: Pod\nmetadata:\n  name: web-app\n  namespace: production\nspec:\n  containers:\n  - name: nginx\n    image: nginx:latest\n    ports:\n    - containerPort: 80\n    securityContext:\n      runAsNonRoot: false\n      privileged: true\n    resources:\n      requests:\n        memory: \"64Mi\"\n        cpu: \"250m\"\n    volumeMounts:\n    - name: config\n      mountPath: /etc/config\n  volumes:\n  - name: config\n    secret:\n      secretName: db-credentials"
}

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill invites users to submit complete Kubernetes manifests, which commonly contain sensitive information such as Secret references, environment variables, internal hostnames, RBAC bindings, and sometimes embedded secret material. The documentation does not clearly warn that this data will be sent to an external third-party API, creating a material data exposure and privacy risk through inadvertent disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill references an external API endpoint for processing Kubernetes manifests, which means user-supplied infrastructure definitions are transmitted outside the local trust boundary. Because Kubernetes YAML often encodes sensitive operational details and sometimes secrets, this external transmission can expose confidential data if users are not fully informed or if the service is not appropriately governed.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 145)May include surrounding context.

md
## References

- **Kong Route:** https://api.mkkpro.com/security/k8s-security-review
- **API Docs:** https://api.mkkpro.com:8022/docs