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Security audit

Cloud Misconfig Scanner

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This cloud scanning skill is purpose-aligned but should be reviewed carefully because it asks users to send sensitive cloud credentials to an external API without clear scope, retention, or least-privilege guidance.

Install or use this only if you are comfortable trusting the external scanning service with cloud access material and cloud inventory data. Use a dedicated, temporary, read-only identity scoped to the exact account, project, subscription, regions, and APIs needed for the scan; do not provide root, owner, administrator, production long-lived, or organization-wide credentials. Confirm the provider's retention, logging, deletion, and credential redaction practices before use.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:29
Finding

Transmission of Reusable Cloud Credentials to an External Scanning Service

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:29-37, SKILL.md:80-81, SKILL.md:149-152, and openapi.json:48-66
Vulnerability Type: External disclosure and unsafe handling of cloud credentials
Risk Level: High
Classification: T09: Insecure Skill Coding Practices

The Skill directs users or agents to provide cloud access keys, secret keys, tokens, or service-account data to a third-party API. The project contains only documentation and an OpenAPI contract; it does not include a local scanner implementation or controls governing how the remote service stores, logs, uses, or deletes submitted credentials.

Vulnerable Code Snippets

SKILL.md:29-37:

json
{
  "provider": "aws",
  "credentials": {
    "access_key_id": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
    "secret_access_key": "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY",
    "region": "us-east-1"
  }
}

SKILL.md:80-81:

markdown
| `provider` | string | Yes | Cloud provider identifier (e.g., `aws`, `azure`, `gcp`, `alibaba`) |
| `credentials` | object | Yes | Provider-specific authentication credentials including access keys, secret keys, tokens, or service account data required to authenticate and access cloud resources |

SKILL.md:149-152:

markdown
- **Kong Route:** https://api.mkkpro.com/security/cloud-misconfig-scanner
- **API Docs:** https://api.mkkpro.com:8018/docs

openapi.json:48-66:

json
"CloudScanRequest": {
  "properties": {
    "provider": {
      "type": "string",
      "title": "Provider"
    },
    "credentials": {
      "type": "object",
      "title": "Credentials"
    }
  },
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "provider",
    "credentials"
  ],
  "title": "CloudScanRequest"
}

Technical Analysis

The API contract requires a generic credentials object and allows it to contain reusable cloud authentication material. The documentation expl ...[truncated 3312 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace long-lived credentials with federation

    • Use provider-native short-lived role assumption, workload identity federation, managed identities, or OAuth device and authorization flows.
    • Do not request secret access keys, private service-account keys, or reusable bearer tokens.
  2. Enforce least privilege

    • Publish provider-specific read-only policies containing only the APIs required for scanning.
    • Require dedicated scanner identities with account, project, subscription, region, and resource boundaries.
    • Reject administrative, root, owner, or organization-management credentials where technically possible.
  3. Prefer local collection

    • Run cloud API discovery locally and send only normalized configuration findings to the external service.
    • Alternatively, deploy the scanner within the customer's controlled cloud account so credentials do not cross the trust boundary.
  4. Add provider-specific schemas

    • Replace the unrestricted credentials object with explicit schemas for each supported provider.
    • Disallow unknown properties and unnecessary secret types.
    • Validate that temporary credentials include expiration and session-token information.
  5. Protect secrets operationally

    • Disable request-body logging at the application, reverse proxy, API gateway, tracing, analytics, and error-reporting layers.
    • Apply structured redaction to all authentication fields.
    • Keep credentials only in memory for the duration of a scan and securely delete any transient copies.
    • Document encryption, retention, access-control, incident-response, and deletion practices.
  6. Introduce informed authorization

    • Clearly identify the external recipient and exact credential fields before transmission.
    • Require explicit user confirmation before an agent sends cloud secrets outside the local environment.
    • Warn users never to provide roo ...[truncated 374 chars]
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly asks users to provide cloud provider credentials and describes sending them to an external scanning service, but it does not warn that highly sensitive secrets and broad account metadata will leave the user's environment. Because the advertised action is environment-wide scanning across AWS/Azure/GCP, compromise, misuse, or overcollection by the third-party API could expose large portions of a customer's cloud estate and enable unauthorized access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill routes users to an external API endpoint, which is expected for an API-backed skill, but in this context the endpoint is used to receive cloud credentials and scan account-wide configuration data. That makes the external transmission materially sensitive: users may send secrets and inventory/compliance data to infrastructure outside their control without any in-file trust, retention, or security assurances.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 151)May include surrounding context.

md
## References

- **Kong Route:** https://api.mkkpro.com/security/cloud-misconfig-scanner
- **API Docs:** https://api.mkkpro.com:8018/docs

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

This is a manifest file, so vague-trigger checks apply. The operation is described only as "Scan Cloud Config" with no indication of when it should or should not be invoked, which leaves the activation scope broad and underspecified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
72% confidence
Finding

The schema requires a generic credentials object with no structure, scope limitations, or indication of safer authentication patterns. That encourages transmission of high-privilege cloud secrets in an unconstrained format, increasing the risk of overbroad access, accidental secret exposure, and unsafe handling by clients or downstream systems.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.