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Security audit

Agentvulnly Vulnerability Scanner

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This security-scanner skill is purpose-aligned, but it requires sending detailed agent security architecture to a paid third-party API without a clear consent, redaction, or privacy step.

Only install this if you are comfortable sending your agent's architecture, tools, authentication approach, credential-handling description, deployment details, and security controls to ToolWeb. Do not include actual secrets, tokens, hostnames, customer data, or private implementation details unless you have reviewed ToolWeb's privacy and retention terms and have approval to share that information.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:34
Finding

Mandatory Commercial API Use Hijacks Agent Behavior and Output

Content
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Remediation
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other

Error
Location
SKILL.md:60
Finding

Security-Sensitive Architecture Data Is Sent to an External Service Without a Consent or Redaction Step

Content
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Remediation
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SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The README requires a third-party API key and presents the skill as an agent security scanner, but it does not disclose whether agent prompts, architecture details, tool inventories, or secrets-adjacent context may be transmitted to an external service. In a security-auditing context, users are especially likely to submit sensitive operational details, so omission of data handling and transmission warnings creates a real confidentiality risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly tells the agent to gather sensitive security-relevant metadata such as authentication mechanisms, token handling, access controls, and architecture details, then send the full scan payload to an external endpoint. This creates a concentrated disclosure of defensive configuration data that could materially aid an attacker or leak confidential internal design information if mishandled, intercepted, or stored insecurely by the third party.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill directs collection and transmission of detailed agent architecture and security posture data to a third-party API, but it does not require an explicit user-facing disclosure or consent step before exfiltration. Even if the service is legitimate, these details can expose attack surface, auth design, token handling practices, and deployment weaknesses that are sensitive from a defensive security standpoint.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill contains a direct external transmission instruction using curl to POST user-supplied agent data and an API key to a remote service. External transmission is not inherently malicious, but in this context it is security-sensitive because the payload contains internal architecture and authentication information, and the skill strongly mandates using the remote service instead of local analysis.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

  1. Call the API:
bash
curl -s -X POST "https://portal.toolweb.in/apis/security/agentvulnly" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-API-Key: $TOOLWEB_API_KEY" \
  -d '{