T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:71- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party CLI Dependency Permits Supply-Chain Code Substitution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 71–80
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned executable dependency from a mutable upstream source
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash go install github.com/krausefx/beeper-cli/cmd/beeper-cli@latestbash git clone https://github.com/krausefx/beeper-cli.git cd beeper-cli go build ./cmd/beeper-cli # Move beeper-cli to PATH, e.g., /usr/local/binTechnical Analysis
Both documented installation methods obtain executable source from mutable upstream references. The recommended command uses
@latest, while the alternative builds the repository's unpinned default branch. Neither method pins a reviewed release or commit, verifies a checksum, nor validates a cryptographic signature.Consequently, the code installed by users can differ from the code present when this Skill was audited. Although the documentation claims that the CLI provides read-only access, this repository contains no local implementation that can independently establish or enforce that property.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the upstream repository, maintainer account, module publication process, or another relevant supply-chain component.
- The attacker publishes a malicious revision selected by
@latestor places malicious code on the repository's default branch. - A user follows one of the installation procedures in
SKILL.md. - Go downloads and compiles the substituted source, producing an attacker-controlled executable.
- The user or agent invokes
beeper-clito browse or search local chat data. - The malicious executable runs with the invoking user's privileges and can access resources available to that user, including the Beeper databases involved in the intended workflow.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation enables arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user who installs or invokes the CLI. The accessible scop ...[truncated 396 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace
@latestwith a specific, reviewed semantic version or immutable commit identifier. - Pin the source-build procedure to the same reviewed release tag or full commit hash rather than building the default branch.
- Publish and verify cryptographic checksums for expected source archives or binaries before installation.
- Where supported, verify signed release tags, commits, provenance attestations, or package signatures against a documented trusted maintainer identity.
- Record the approved version and expected digest in
SKILL.mdso installations are reproducible. - Review dependency lock information and the complete transitive dependency graph for the pinned revision.
- Run the CLI with least privilege and restrict its filesystem and network access where practical, particularly when processing sensitive chat databases.
- Establish a controlled update process in which new upstream versions are reviewed and their hashes deliberately updated rather than selected automatically.
- Replace
