T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:149- Finding
Runtime Installation of an Unpinned Third-Party Package
- Content
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{ exec('npm install @the-bot-club/agentguard --save', { cwd: process.cwd() }, (error, stdout, stderr) => { if (error) reject(error); else resolve(stdout); }); }); } ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill instructs the agent to install `@the-bot-club/agentguard` from the npm registry at runtime. The dependency is not pinned to an exact version, and the project contains no package lockfile, integrity digest, vendored source, or other mechanism that would ensure the installed package matches the code that was originally reviewed. The package installation may also execute npm lifecycle scripts with the permissions of the agent process. Because registry contents can change independently of this skill, the effective code executed by the skill is mutable after review. This finding does not establish that the named package is itself malicious. The vulnerability is that the skill places an unpinned and unaudited dependency directly into a security-sensitive execution path. ### Attack Path 1. A user invokes the skill to secure an agent. 2. The skill runs `npm install @the-bot-club/agentguard --save` in the current working directory. 3. npm resolves the package version available from the configured registry at execution time. 4. A compromised package version, registry response, maintainer account, or transitive dependency supplies attacker-controlled code. 5. npm lifecycle scripts or subsequently imported package code execute under the agent process identity. 6. The malicious dependency can access files, environment variables, network resources, and other capabilities available to that process. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could provide arbitr ...[truncated 452 chars]- Remediation
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