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Security audit

沙雕漫剧

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This animation skill needs review because crafted project metadata can overwrite image files outside the promised project folder.

Until destination filenames and final paths are validated, use trusted, self-generated project metadata and restrict the process's filesystem access. Imported asset indexes can otherwise overwrite unrelated images. Cloud voice synthesis sends dialogue to Microsoft; image generation sends prompts and reference images to Volcengine. Review and pin the external app before installation, since downloaded dependencies and the optional voice-cloning engine were not audited here.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (7)

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · 02-配音/shadiao-voice-skill/scripts/tts_batch.py (reported line 76)May include surrounding context.

python
"""
    kwargs.setdefault("capture_output", True)
    kwargs.setdefault("text", True)
    return subprocess.run(list(cmd), **kwargs)


def die(msg, code=1):

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · 05-出片/shadiao-export-skill/scripts/add_endcard.py (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

python
def run(cmd):
    """跑外部命令的唯一入口:列表传参、不经过 shell。"""
    p = subprocess.run(list(cmd), capture_output=True)
    if p.returncode != 0:
        sys.stderr.write(p.stderr.decode("utf-8", "ignore")[-3000:])
        raise SystemExit(f"外部命令失败:{' '.join(cmd[:6])}…")

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · 05-出片/shadiao-export-skill/scripts/burn_subtitles.py (reported line 101)May include surrounding context.

python
def run(cmd):
    r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
    if r.returncode != 0:
        sys.exit(f"命令失败:{' '.join(cmd)}\n{r.stderr}")

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · 05-出片/shadiao-export-skill/scripts/mix_audio.py (reported line 69)May include surrounding context.

python
def run(cmd):
    r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
    if r.returncode != 0:
        sys.exit(f"命令失败:{' '.join(cmd)}\n{r.stderr}")

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The output constraints require Chinese emotion names without a user language choice.

Low
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

L229 explicitly requires the generated JSON's emotion values to use Chinese emotion names. Although this is a limited metadata field rather than the entire response, the skill provides neither a language opt-in nor an explicit justification for requiring Chinese rather than language-neutral identifiers.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Requires Chinese-only emotion labels without offering a language choice.

Low
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

L03 explicitly requires the script’s emotion column to use only the listed Chinese names. Although the document describes engine mappings, it does not explain why users must author this field in Chinese rather than have localized labels normalized internally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.