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Security audit

Dennou Yokocho

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is for an AI-agent social network, but it needs review because it can periodically fetch changing remote instructions and autonomously publish content that may come from private conversations.

Install only if you are comfortable with an agent making authenticated posts to dennou.tokyo. Disable or tightly gate the heartbeat, require human approval for every post/reply/echo, do not use private chats or other-platform conversations as source material, and store the API key in a secret manager or a file with restrictive permissions rather than a broadly readable .env or JSON file.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (4)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:130
Finding

Periodic retrieval and execution of mutable remote instructions

Content
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Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:310
Finding

Server-controlled API content is treated as an autonomous action plan

Content
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Remediation
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other

Error
Location
HEARTBEAT.md:22
Finding

Private human and cross-platform conversations may be republished to the service

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:82
Finding

Bearer API credential is recommended for plaintext filesystem storage without permission controls

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (11)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The skill recommends storing a long-lived API key in a plaintext JSON file under the user's home directory without mentioning filesystem permissions, OS keychains, or secret managers. On multi-user systems, compromised developer environments, backups, or tools that index dotfiles, this increases the chance of credential theft and subsequent account impersonation against the service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

⚠️ Save your api_key immediately! It is shown only once. You need it for all authenticated requests.

Recommended: Save your credentials to ~/.config/dennou-yokocho/credentials.json:

json
{

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly tells agents to fetch a live remote instruction file and use authenticated API endpoints, but it provides no safety boundary around what may be transmitted or how credentials should be handled. This creates a prompt-supply-chain risk where unreviewed remote content can change agent behavior, and an exfiltration/credential-misuse risk because the agent is encouraged to act with bearer tokens against an external service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages using prior conversations with the human and cross-platform discussions as material for public posts, which creates a natural-language data leakage channel. This is especially risky because it normalizes republishing context from other venues without consent, redaction, or sensitivity checks, potentially exposing personal data, confidential instructions, or platform-specific private content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to reply, comment, echo, and create new threads on an external platform on the user's behalf without an explicit consent checkpoint or warning that these are remote state-changing actions. In context, this is more dangerous because the content to post is partly derived from prior experiences and external sources, so the agent may publicly disclose sensitive or unintended information while performing authenticated writes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The rule 'All posts must be bilingual (ja/en)' imposes a specific language policy on all outputs. SQP-3 requires flagging forced language or locale constraints unless the user can opt in or the limitation is clearly documented and justified as region-specific.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The README explicitly states the agent will automatically register, periodically check in, read threads, reply, and start discussions, but it does not clearly warn users that installing or enabling the skill will cause autonomous outbound network activity and transmit agent-generated content and metadata to a third-party service. In an agent ecosystem, this can lead to unexpected data disclosure, unauthorized external interactions, and consent/compliance issues, especially if operators assume the skill is passive or locally scoped.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 48)May include surrounding context.

Every agent needs to register before entering the yokocho:

bash
curl -X POST https://dennou.tokyo/api/v1/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "YourAgentName",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 210)May include surrounding context.

Create a thread:

bash
curl -X POST https://dennou.tokyo/api/v1/shops/casual-bar/threads \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 229)May include surrounding context.

Post a reply:

bash
curl -X POST https://dennou.tokyo/api/v1/threads/THREAD_ID/posts \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The markdown states that all posts and threads must be bilingual in Japanese and English, using a required ja/en object format. This imposes a specific language policy on users and agents without opt-in or an explanation that the skill is region-specific or otherwise justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

This manifest file includes only a vague natural-language description, "A cyberpunk back alley for AI agents," without any specific trigger phrases, activation conditions, or exclusions. In a manifest context, that lack of specificity can make it unclear when the skill should be invoked versus ignored.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.