T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/bigfocus.py:421- Finding
Server-Side Request Forgery Through Insufficient Product URL Validation
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
BigFocus mostly matches its stated tracker purpose, but its persistent scheduled scans can make unsafe user-controlled web requests and its stored tracker data can be corrupted by unescaped input.
Install only if you are comfortable with a persistent hourly tracker that can read and write its workspace memory, perform web searches, fetch product/API pages, and send update messages. Review or patch URL validation before enabling automatic product scans, keep cron setup explicit, and avoid adding tracker names, targets, or values from untrusted sources until the Markdown storage is hardened.
scripts/bigfocus.py:421Server-Side Request Forgery Through Insufficient Product URL Validation
scripts/bigfocus.py:78Persistent Tracker Corruption and Markdown Injection Through Unescaped Fields
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
The trigger phrase set includes broad activators such as 'bigfocus', which can appear in normal conversation and unintentionally invoke the skill. Because the skill can perform file writes, web searches, and scheduled operations, accidental activation can lead to unintended data changes or background monitoring setup.
Several triggers like '添加追踪', '删除追踪', '恢复追踪', and '价格追踪' are generic conversational phrases that could match ordinary discussion rather than a deliberate tool invocation. In this skill's context, that raises the risk of unintended reads/writes and erroneous state changes, especially when combined with automation and cron-backed persistence.
The add flow is internally contradictory: one section says no write occurs until the user confirms, but the later steps describe adding first and then updating or removing on follow-up. In an agent setting, contradictory instructions can cause premature writes before consent, creating unauthorized persistent state changes or accidental tracking entries.
This shell script installs a recurring cron task that performs scans and may push updates via messaging channels, affecting external systems on an automated basis. The file contains operational steps but no explicit warning, confirmation, or user-facing disclosure that it will create a scheduled job and send notifications to a target channel/chat.
This manifest-style JSON defines a trigger-like entry named “定时扫描(每整点)”, but it does not specify concrete activation boundaries beyond a human-readable label. There are no explicit exclusion conditions or negative examples, which could make the invocation scope unclear in systems that map descriptions or names to activation behavior.
The natural-language instruction string is entirely in Chinese and directs the agent's behavior in that locale without offering user opt-in or any language-selection mechanism. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without user choice is a locale-policy concern unless the constraint is explicitly documented and justified.
The natural-language interface, usage strings, status messages, and help text are consistently presented only in Chinese, with no option for user language selection. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a locale/language policy violation unless the constraint is explicitly justified.
Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.
lines.append(_format_table_row(item))
lines.append('') # trailing newline
with open(TRACKER_FILE, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f:
f.write('\n'.join(lines))
return items
Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.
def _save_raw_data(data):
with open(RAW_DATA_FILE, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f:
json.dump(data, f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
The skill makes outbound HTTP requests to user-supplied or skill-derived targets during automatic scanning without any explicit user-facing disclosure or consent gate. This can leak user tracking interests and cause unexpected network access to third-party services, especially when product URLs or monitored indicators encode sensitive interests or identifiers.
The script transmits data to an external service (CoinGecko API) during automatic metric fetching. While the request is limited, external transmission still expands the trust boundary and can expose usage patterns, monitored interests, timing metadata, and network identifiers without strong user awareness.
try:
# CoinGecko 免费 API
req = Request(
'https://api.coingecko.com/api/v3/simple/price?ids=bitcoin&vs_currencies=usd',
headers={'Accept': 'application/json'}
)
resp = urlopen(req, timeout=10)
The cron configuration hard-codes the timezone to "Asia/Shanghai", which imposes a locale-specific behavior without indicating user choice or opt-in. This can violate language/locale policy expectations when the skill is used by users in other regions.
The script sets --tz "Asia/Shanghai", which imposes a specific locale setting in natural-language-configured behavior. There is no indication that the user opted into this locale or that the skill is intentionally restricted to that region.
No suspicious patterns detected.