1claw

HSM-backed secret management for AI agents — store, retrieve, rotate, and share secrets via the 1Claw vault without exposing them in context.

1Claw — HSM-Backed Secret Management for AI Agents

1Claw is a cloud HSM-backed secrets manager. Agents access API keys, passwords, and credentials at runtime without them ever entering the conversation context. Secrets are encrypted with keys that never leave the HSM.

API base URL: https://api.1claw.xyz Shroud (TEE proxy): https://shroud.1claw.xyz MCP endpoint: https://mcp.1claw.xyz/mcp Dashboard: https://1claw.xyz Docs: https://docs.1claw.xyz

When to use this skill

• You need an API key, password, or credential to complete a task
• You want to store a newly generated credential securely
• You need to share a secret with a user or another agent
• You need to rotate a credential after regenerating it
• You want to check what secrets are available before using one
• You need to sign or simulate an EVM transaction without exposing private keys
• You want TEE-grade key isolation for transaction signing (use Shroud at shroud.1claw.xyz)

---

Setup

Option 0: Self-enrollment (new agents)

If you don't have credentials yet, self-enroll — this sends them to your human:

bash

# curl
curl -s -X POST https://api.1claw.xyz/v1/agents/enroll \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"my-agent","human_email":"[e-mail]"}'

# TypeScript SDK (static method, no auth needed)
import { AgentsResource } from "@1claw/sdk";
await AgentsResource.enroll("https://api.1claw.xyz", {
  name: "my-agent",
  human_email: "[e-mail]",
});

# CLI (no auth needed)
npx @1claw/cli agent enroll my-agent --email [e-mail]

The human receives the Agent ID + API key by email. They then configure policies for your access.

Option 1: MCP server (recommended for AI agents)

Add to your MCP client configuration. Only the API key is required — agent ID and vault are auto-discovered.

json

{
    "mcpServers": {
        "1claw": {
            "command": "npx",
            "args": ["-y", "@1claw/mcp"],
            "env": {
                "ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY": "<agent-api-key>"
            }
        }
    }
}

Optional overrides: ONECLAW_AGENT_ID (explicit agent), ONECLAW_VAULT_ID (explicit vault).

Hosted HTTP streaming mode:

text

URL: https://mcp.1claw.xyz/mcp
Headers:
  Authorization: Bearer <agent-jwt>
  X-Vault-ID: <vault-uuid>

Option 2: TypeScript SDK

bash

npm install @1claw/sdk

ts

import { createClient } from "@1claw/sdk";

const client = createClient({
    baseUrl: "https://api.1claw.xyz",
    apiKey: process.env.ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY,
});

Option 3: Direct REST API

Authenticate, then pass the Bearer token on every request.

bash

# Exchange agent API key for a JWT (key-only — agent_id is auto-resolved)
RESP=$(curl -s -X POST https://api.1claw.xyz/v1/auth/agent-token \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"api_key":"<key>"}')
TOKEN=$(echo "$RESP" | jq -r .access_token)
AGENT_ID=$(echo "$RESP" | jq -r .agent_id)

# Use the JWT
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://api.1claw.xyz/v1/vaults

Alternative: 1ck_ API keys (personal or agent) can be used directly as Bearer tokens — no JWT exchange needed.

---

Authentication

Agent auth flow

1. Human registers an agent in the dashboard or via POST /v1/agents with an auth_method (api_key default, mtls, or oidc_client_credentials). For api_key agents → receives agent_id + api_key (prefix ocv_). For mTLS/OIDC agents → receives agent_id only (no API key).
2. All agents auto-receive an Ed25519 SSH keypair (public key on agent record, private key in __agent-keys vault).
3. API key agents exchange credentials: POST /v1/auth/agent-token with { "api_key": "<key>" } (or { "agent_id": "<uuid>", "api_key": "<key>" }) → returns { "access_token": "<jwt>", "expires_in": 3600, "agent_id": "<uuid>", "vault_ids": ["..."] }. Agent ID is optional — the server resolves it from the key prefix.
4. Agent uses Authorization: Bearer <jwt> on all subsequent requests.
5. JWT scopes derive from the agent's access policies (path patterns). If no policies exist, scopes are empty (zero access). The agent's vault_ids are also included in the JWT — requests to unlisted vaults are rejected.
6. Token TTL defaults to ~1 hour but can be set per-agent via token_ttl_seconds. The MCP server auto-refreshes 60s before expiry.

API key auth

Tokens starting with 1ck_ (human personal API keys) or ocv_ (agent API keys) can be used as Bearer tokens directly on any authenticated endpoint.

---

MCP Tools Reference

list_secrets

List all secrets in the vault. Returns paths, types, and versions — never values.

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
prefix	string	no	Path prefix to filter (e.g. api-keys/)

get_secret

Fetch the decrypted value of a secret. Use immediately before the API call that needs it. Never store the value or include it in summaries.

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
path	string	yes	Secret path (e.g. api-keys/stripe)

put_secret

Store a new secret or update an existing one. Each call creates a new version.

Parameter	Type	Required	Default	Description
path	string	yes		Secret path
value	string	yes		The secret value
type	string	no	api_key	One of: api_key, password, private_key, certificate, file, note, ssh_key, env_bundle
metadata	object	no		Arbitrary JSON metadata
expires_at	string	no		ISO 8601 expiry datetime
max_access_count	number	no		Max reads before auto-expiry (0 = unlimited)

delete_secret

Soft-delete a secret. Reversible by an admin.

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
path	string	yes	Secret path to delete

describe_secret

Get metadata (type, version, expiry) without fetching the value. Use to check existence.

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
path	string	yes	Secret path

rotate_and_store

Store a new value for an existing secret, creating a new version. Use after regenerating a key.

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
path	string	yes	Secret path
value	string	yes	New secret value

get_env_bundle

Fetch an env_bundle secret and parse its KEY=VALUE lines as JSON.

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
path	string	yes	Path to an env_bundle secret

create_vault

Create a new vault for organizing secrets.

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
name	string	yes	Vault name (1–255 chars)
description	string	no	Short description

list_vaults

List all vaults accessible to you. No parameters.

grant_access

Grant a user or agent access to a vault path pattern.

Parameter	Type	Required	Default	Description
vault_id	string (UUID)	yes		Vault ID
principal_type	user | agent	yes		Who to grant access to
principal_id	string (UUID)	yes		The user or agent UUID
permissions	string[]	no	["read"]	["read"], ["write"], or ["read","write"]
secret_path_pattern	string	no	**	Glob pattern for secret paths

share_secret

Share a secret via link, with your creator, or with a specific user/agent.

Parameter	Type	Required	Description
secret_id	string (UUID)	yes	The secret's UUID
recipient_type	user | agent | anyone_with_link | creator	yes	creator shares with the human who registered this agent — no ID needed
recipient_id	string (UUID)	conditional	Required for user and agent types
expires_at	string	yes	ISO 8601 expiry
max_access_count	number	no (default 5)	Max reads (0 = unlimited)

Targeted shares (creator/user/agent) require the recipient to explicitly accept before access.

simulate_transaction

Simulate an EVM transaction via Tenderly without signing. Returns balance changes, gas estimates, success/revert status.

Parameter	Type	Required	Default	Description
to	string	yes		Destination address (0x-prefixed)
value	string	yes		Value in ETH (e.g. "0.01")
chain	string	yes		Chain name or chain ID (see Supported Chains)
data	string	no		Hex-encoded calldata
signing_key_path	string	no	keys/{chain}-signer	Vault path to signing key
gas_limit	number	no	21000	Gas limit

submit_transaction

Submit an EVM transaction for signing and optional broadcast. Requires intents_api_enabled.

Parameter	Type	Required	Default	Description
to	string	yes		Destination address
value	string	yes		Value in ETH
chain	string	yes		Chain name or chain ID
data	string	no		Hex-encoded calldata
signing_key_path	string	no	keys/{chain}-signer	Vault path to signing key
nonce	number	no	auto-resolved	Transaction nonce
gas_price	string	no		Gas price in wei (legacy mode)
gas_limit	number	no	21000	Gas limit
max_fee_per_gas	string	no		EIP-1559 max fee in wei (triggers Type 2)
max_priority_fee_per_gas	string	no		EIP-1559 priority fee in wei
simulate_first	boolean	no	true	Run Tenderly simulation before signing

---

REST API Quick Reference

Base URL: https://api.1claw.xyz. All authenticated endpoints require Authorization: Bearer <token>.

Auth (public — no token required)

Method	Path	Description
POST	/v1/auth/token	Login (email + password) → { access_token }
POST	/v1/auth/agent-token	Agent login (agent_id + api_key) → { access_token }
POST	/v1/auth/google	Google OAuth
POST	/v1/auth/signup	Create account → sends verification email
POST	/v1/auth/verify-email	Verify email token → creates user
POST	/v1/auth/mfa/verify	Verify MFA code during login

Auth (authenticated)

Method	Path	Description
GET	/v1/auth/me	Get current user profile
PATCH	/v1/auth/me	Update profile (display_name, marketing_emails)
DELETE	/v1/auth/me	Delete account (body: { "confirmation": "DELETE MY ACCOUNT" })
DELETE	/v1/auth/token	Revoke current token
POST	/v1/auth/change-password	Change password

Vaults

Method	Path	Description
POST	/v1/vaults	Create vault ({ name, description? }) → 201
GET	/v1/vaults	List vaults → { vaults: [...] }
GET	/v1/vaults/{id}	Get vault details
DELETE	/v1/vaults/{id}	Delete vault → 204
POST	/v1/vaults/{id}/cmek	Enable CMEK ({ fingerprint })
DELETE	/v1/vaults/{id}/cmek	Disable CMEK
POST	/v1/vaults/{id}/cmek-rotate	Start CMEK key rotation (headers: X-CMEK-Old-Key, X-CMEK-New-Key)
GET	/v1/vaults/{id}/cmek-rotate/{job_id}	Get rotation job status

Secrets

Method	Path	Description
PUT	/v1/vaults/{id}/secrets/{path}	Store/update secret ({ type, value, metadata?, expires_at?, max_access_count? }) → 201
GET	/v1/vaults/{id}/secrets/{path}	Read secret → { path, type, value, version, metadata }
DELETE	/v1/vaults/{id}/secrets/{path}	Delete secret → 204
GET	/v1/vaults/{id}/secrets?prefix=...	List secrets (metadata only, no values)

Agents

Method	Path	Description
POST	/v1/agents	Create agent → { agent: {...}, api_key: "ocv_..." }
GET	/v1/agents	List agents → { agents: [...] }
GET	/v1/agents/{id}	Get agent
GET	/v1/agents/me	Get current agent (self)
PATCH	/v1/agents/{id}	Update agent (is_active, scopes, intents_api_enabled, guardrails)
DELETE	/v1/agents/{id}	Delete agent → 204
POST	/v1/agents/{id}/rotate-key	Rotate agent API key → { api_key: "ocv_..." }
POST	/v1/agents/{id}/rotate-identity-keys	Rotate agent SSH + ECDH keypairs (user-only; keys in __agent-keys vault)

Policies (Access Control)

Method	Path	Description
POST	/v1/vaults/{id}/policies	Create policy ({ principal_type, principal_id, secret_path_pattern, permissions, conditions?, expires_at? })
GET	/v1/vaults/{id}/policies	List policies for vault
PUT	/v1/vaults/{id}/policies/{pid}	Update policy (permissions, conditions, expires_at only)
DELETE	/v1/vaults/{id}/policies/{pid}	Delete policy → 204

Sharing

Method	Path	Description
POST	/v1/secrets/{id}/share	Create share link
GET	/v1/shares/outbound	List shares you created
GET	/v1/shares/inbound	List shares sent to you
POST	/v1/shares/{id}/accept	Accept an inbound share
POST	/v1/shares/{id}/decline	Decline an inbound share
DELETE	/v1/share/{id}	Revoke a share
GET	/v1/share/{id}	Access a share (public, may require passphrase)

Intents API (requires intents_api_enabled)

Method	Path	Description
POST	/v1/agents/{id}/transactions	Submit transaction for signing. Optional Idempotency-Key header for replay protection (24h TTL)
GET	/v1/agents/{id}/transactions	List agent's transactions. signed_tx redacted unless ?include_signed_tx=true
GET	/v1/agents/{id}/transactions/{txid}	Get transaction details. signed_tx redacted unless ?include_signed_tx=true
POST	/v1/agents/{id}/transactions/simulate	Simulate single transaction
POST	/v1/agents/{id}/transactions/simulate-bundle	Simulate transaction bundle

Audit

Method	Path	Description
GET	/v1/audit/events?limit=N&action=...&from=...&to=...	Query audit events

Billing

Method	Path	Description
GET	/v1/billing/subscription	Subscription status, usage, credit balance
GET	/v1/billing/credits/balance	Credit balance + expiring credits
GET	/v1/billing/credits/transactions	Credit transaction ledger
PATCH	/v1/billing/overage-method	Set overage method (credits or x402)
GET	/v1/billing/usage	Usage summary (current month)
GET	/v1/billing/history	Usage event history

Chains

Method	Path	Description
GET	/v1/chains	List supported chains
GET	/v1/chains/{name_or_id}	Get chain details

Other

Method	Path	Description
GET	/v1/health	Health check → { status, service, version }
GET	/v1/health/hsm	HSM health → { status, hsm_provider, connected }
POST/GET/DELETE	/v1/auth/api-keys[/{id}]	Manage personal API keys
GET/POST/DELETE	/v1/security/ip-rules[/{id}]	Manage IP allowlist/blocklist
GET/PATCH/DELETE	/v1/org/members[/{id}]	Manage org members

---

SDK Method Reference

All methods return Promise<OneclawResponse<T>>. Access via client.<resource>.<method>(...).

Resource	Method	Description
vaults	create({ name, description? })	Create vault
vaults	get(vaultId)	Get vault
vaults	list()	List vaults
vaults	delete(vaultId)	Delete vault
secrets	set(vaultId, key, value, { type?, metadata?, expires_at?, max_access_count? })	Store/update secret
secrets	get(vaultId, key)	Read secret (decrypted)
secrets	list(vaultId, prefix?)	List secret metadata
secrets	delete(vaultId, key)	Delete secret
secrets	rotate(vaultId, key, newValue)	Rotate secret to new version
agents	create({ name, description?, scopes?, expires_at?, intents_api_enabled?, token_ttl_seconds?, vault_ids? })	Create agent → returns agent + api_key
agents	get(agentId)	Get agent
agents	list()	List agents
agents	update(agentId, { is_active?, scopes?, intents_api_enabled?, tx_*? })	Update agent
agents	delete(agentId)	Delete agent
agents	rotateKey(agentId)	Rotate agent API key
agents	submitTransaction(agentId, { to, value, chain, ... })	Submit EVM transaction
agents	simulateTransaction(agentId, { to, value, chain, ... })	Simulate transaction
agents	simulateBundle(agentId, bundle)	Simulate transaction bundle
agents	getTransaction(agentId, txId)	Get transaction
agents	listTransactions(agentId)	List agent transactions
access	grantAgent(vaultId, agentId, permissions, { path?, conditions?, expires_at? })	Grant agent access
access	grantHuman(vaultId, userId, permissions, { path?, conditions?, expires_at? })	Grant user access
access	listGrants(vaultId)	List policies
access	update(vaultId, policyId, { permissions?, conditions?, expires_at? })	Update policy
access	revoke(vaultId, policyId)	Revoke policy
sharing	create(secretId, { recipient_type, recipient_id?, expires_at, max_access_count? })	Create share
sharing	access(shareId)	Access shared secret
sharing	listOutbound()	Shares you created
sharing	listInbound()	Shares sent to you
sharing	accept(shareId)	Accept inbound share
sharing	decline(shareId)	Decline inbound share
sharing	revoke(shareId)	Revoke outbound share
audit	query({ action?, actor_id?, from?, to?, limit?, offset? })	Query audit events
billing	usage()	Current month usage
billing	history(limit?)	Usage event history
auth	login({ email, password })	Human login
auth	agentToken({ agent_id, api_key })	Agent JWT exchange
auth	logout()	Revoke token
apiKeys	create({ name, scopes?, expires_at? })	Create personal API key
apiKeys	list()	List API keys
apiKeys	revoke(keyId)	Revoke key
chains	list()	List supported chains
chains	get(identifier)	Get chain by name or ID
org	listMembers()	List org members
org	updateMemberRole(userId, role)	Update member role
org	removeMember(userId)	Remove member

OpenAPI spec for custom SDKs

The API spec is published as an npm package for generating clients in any language:

bash

npm install @1claw/openapi-spec

Ships openapi.yaml and openapi.json. Use with any OpenAPI 3.1 codegen tool:

bash

# TypeScript
npx openapi-typescript node_modules/@1claw/openapi-spec/openapi.yaml -o ./types.ts

# Python
openapi-generator generate -i node_modules/@1claw/openapi-spec/openapi.yaml -g python -o ./oneclaw-py

# Go
oapi-codegen -package oneclaw node_modules/@1claw/openapi-spec/openapi.yaml > oneclaw.go

SDK also re-exports generated types: import type { ApiSchemas } from "@1claw/sdk".

---

Supported Chains

Default chain registry (query GET /v1/chains for live list):

Name	Chain ID	Testnet
ethereum	1	no
base	8453	no
optimism	10	no
arbitrum-one	42161	no
polygon	137	no
sepolia	11155111	yes
base-sepolia	84532	yes

Use chain names (e.g. "base", "sepolia") or numeric chain IDs in transaction requests.

---

Access Control Model

Agents do not get blanket access. A human must create a policy to grant an agent access to specific secret paths.

• Path patterns: Glob syntax — api-keys/*, db/**, ** (all)
• Permissions: read, write (delete requires write)
• Conditions: IP allowlist, time windows (JSON)
• Expiry: Optional ISO 8601 date

If no policy matches → 403 Forbidden. Vault creators always have full access (owner bypass).

Vault binding and token scoping

Agents can be restricted beyond policies:

• vault_ids: Restrict the agent to specific vaults. If non-empty, any request to a vault not in the list returns 403.
• token_ttl_seconds: Custom JWT expiry per agent (e.g., 300 for 5-minute tokens).
• Scopes from policies: JWT scopes are derived from the agent's access policies. If an agent has no policies and no explicit scopes, it has zero access.

Set via dashboard, CLI (--token-ttl, --vault-ids), SDK, or API.

Customer-Managed Encryption Keys (CMEK)

Enterprise opt-in feature (Business tier and above). A human generates a 256-bit AES key in the dashboard — the key never leaves their device. Only its SHA-256 fingerprint is stored on the server.

• Enable: POST /v1/vaults/{id}/cmek with { fingerprint }
• Disable: DELETE /v1/vaults/{id}/cmek
• Rotate: POST /v1/vaults/{id}/cmek-rotate (server-assisted, batched in 100s)
• Secrets stored in a CMEK vault have cmek_encrypted: true in responses

Agents reading from a CMEK vault receive the encrypted blob. The CMEK key is required to decrypt client-side. This is designed for organizations with compliance requirements — the default HSM encryption is already strong.

Intents API

When intents_api_enabled = true (set by a human):

1. Agent gains transaction signing via the Intents API (keys stay in HSM)
2. Agent is blocked from reading private_key and ssh_key secrets directly (403)

Default signing key path: keys/{chain}-signer. Override with signing_key_path.

Replay protection (Idempotency-Key)

Include an Idempotency-Key: <unique-string> header on POST /v1/agents/{id}/transactions. The server SHA-256 hashes the key and caches the result for 24 hours. Duplicate submissions with the same key return the cached response instead of re-signing and re-broadcasting. If two concurrent requests share a key, one returns 409 (retry after a moment).

Server-side nonce serialization

When nonce is omitted from a transaction request, the server resolves it automatically via eth_getTransactionCount (pending) and serializes concurrent callers with SELECT FOR UPDATE. This prevents two in-flight submissions from the same agent+chain+address from receiving the same nonce. You can still pass an explicit nonce to override.

signed_tx field gating

GET endpoints (/v1/agents/{id}/transactions and /v1/agents/{id}/transactions/{txid}) redact the signed_tx field by default to reduce exfiltration risk. To include it, pass ?include_signed_tx=true. The initial POST response always includes signed_tx for the originating caller.

Transaction guardrails

Human-configured, server-enforced limits on what the Intents API allows:

Guardrail	Field	Effect
Allowed destinations	tx_to_allowlist	Only listed addresses permitted. Empty = unrestricted
Max value per tx	tx_max_value_eth	Single-tx cap in ETH. NULL = unlimited
Daily spend limit	tx_daily_limit_eth	Rolling 24h cumulative cap. NULL = unlimited
Allowed chains	tx_allowed_chains	Chain names. Empty = all chains

Agents cannot modify their own guardrails. Violations return 403 with a descriptive error.

Shroud per-agent LLM proxy

When shroud_enabled = true (set by a human), the agent's LLM traffic is routed through Shroud (shroud.1claw.xyz) for secret redaction, PII scrubbing, prompt injection defense, threat detection, and policy enforcement inside a TEE.

shroud_config is an optional JSON object that lets humans fine-tune the proxy behavior per agent:

Basic settings

Field	Type	Description
pii_policy	"block" | "redact" | "warn" | "allow"	How PII in LLM traffic is handled
injection_threshold	number (0.0–1.0)	Prompt injection detection sensitivity
context_injection_threshold	number (0.0–1.0)	Context injection detection sensitivity
allowed_providers	string[]	LLM providers the agent may use (empty = all)
allowed_models	string[]	Models the agent may use (empty = all)
denied_models	string[]	Models explicitly blocked
max_tokens_per_request	number	Token cap per LLM request
max_requests_per_minute	number	Per-minute rate limit
max_requests_per_day	number	Per-day rate limit
daily_budget_usd	number	Daily LLM spend cap in USD
enable_secret_redaction	boolean	Redact vault secrets from LLM context
enable_response_filtering	boolean	Filter sensitive data from LLM responses

Threat detection settings

Multi-layered detection for prompt injection, command injection, social engineering, and data exfiltration attempts:

Field	Type	Description
unicode_normalization	object	Homoglyph/zero-width character normalization (see below)
command_injection_detection	object	Detect shell commands, path traversal, reverse shells
social_engineering_detection	object	Detect urgency, authority claims, secrecy requests, bypass attempts
encoding_detection	object	Detect base64, hex, Unicode escapes that may hide payloads
network_detection	object	Detect blocked domains, IP URLs, data exfiltration patterns
filesystem_detection	object	Detect sensitive paths (/etc/passwd, .ssh/, .env, etc.)
sanitization_mode	string	"block" (reject threats), "sanitize" (strip), "warn" (log)
threat_logging	boolean	Log detected threats for audit (default: true)

unicode_normalization object:

Field	Type	Default	Description
enabled	boolean	true	Enable Unicode normalization
strip_zero_width	boolean	true	Remove zero-width characters (U+200B, U+200C)
normalize_homoglyphs	boolean	true	Convert look-alike characters (Cyrillic а → a)
normalization_form	string	"NFKC"	Unicode form: "NFC", "NFKC", "NFD", "NFKD"

command_injection_detection object:

Field	Type	Default	Description
action	string	"block"	"block", "sanitize", or "warn"
strictness	string	"default"	"strict" (more patterns), "default", "relaxed"

social_engineering_detection object:

Field	Type	Default	Description
action	string	"warn"	"block" or "warn"
sensitivity	string	"medium"	"low" (more triggers), "medium", "high"

encoding_detection object:

Field	Type	Default	Description
action	string	"warn"	"block", "decode", or "warn"
detect_base64	boolean	true	Detect base64 encoded content
detect_hex	boolean	true	Detect \xNN hex escapes
detect_unicode	boolean	true	Detect \uNNNN Unicode escapes

network_detection object:

Field	Type	Default	Description
action	string	"warn"	"block" or "warn"
blocked_domains	string[]	pastebin, ngrok, etc.	Domains to block (subdomains auto)
allowed_domains	string[]	[]	Allowlist (empty = blocklist mode)

filesystem_detection object:

Field	Type	Default	Description
action	string	"log"	"block", "sanitize", or "log"
blocked_paths	string[]	/etc/passwd, .ssh/, .env, etc.	Paths to detect

SDK:

typescript

await client.agents.create({
    name: "my-agent",
    shroud_enabled: true,
    shroud_config: {
        pii_policy: "redact",
        injection_threshold: 0.8,
        allowed_providers: ["openai", "anthropic"],
        max_requests_per_day: 1000,
        daily_budget_usd: 10.0,
        enable_secret_redaction: true,
        // Threat detection
        unicode_normalization: { enabled: true, normalize_homoglyphs: true },
        command_injection_detection: { action: "block", strictness: "default" },
        social_engineering_detection: { action: "warn", sensitivity: "medium" },
        encoding_detection: { action: "warn", detect_base64: true },
        network_detection: { action: "warn", blocked_domains: ["pastebin.com"] },
        filesystem_detection: { action: "log" },
        sanitization_mode: "block",
        threat_logging: true,
    },
});

await client.agents.update(agentId, {
    shroud_enabled: true,
    shroud_config: { pii_policy: "block", injection_threshold: 0.9 },
});

CLI:

bash

1claw agent create my-agent --shroud
1claw agent update <agent-id> --shroud true
1claw agent update <agent-id> --shroud false

MCP: When shroud_enabled is true, the agent can send LLM requests through shroud.1claw.xyz. The Shroud proxy enforces the agent's shroud_config policy automatically — no client-side changes needed.

---

Share with Your Human

Agents can share secrets back with the human who created or enrolled them. Use recipient_type: "creator" — no email or user ID needed.

Via MCP:

text

share_secret(secret_id: "...", recipient_type: "creator", expires_at: "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z")

Via SDK:

typescript

await client.sharing.create(secretId, {
    recipient_type: "creator",
    expires_at: "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z",
    max_access_count: 5,
});

The human sees the share in their Inbound shares and accepts it. This is the primary pattern for agents that discover or generate credentials and need to report them to their human.

---

Fleet Patterns

When many agents operate in the same organization:

• Vault organization: Use a shared vault with path-scoped policies (e.g. agents/{name}/**) or per-agent vaults for strict isolation.
• Bulk provisioning: Use the authenticated POST /v1/agents endpoint with a human API key to create many agents, or stagger self-enrollment calls to respect the 10-min per-email cooldown.
• Vault binding: Set vault_ids on each agent to restrict JWT scope beyond what policies allow.
• Token TTL: Shorten to 5 min for ephemeral tasks (token_ttl_seconds: 300), keep default 1h for long-running agents.
• Transaction guardrails: Apply tx_max_value_eth, tx_daily_limit_eth, and tx_allowed_chains to all Intents API agents.
• Monitoring: Filter the audit log by agent ID to track per-agent activity. Use billing usage to monitor org-wide consumption.

---

Security Model

• Credentials are configured by the human, not the agent. The MCP server reads them from env vars.
• The agent never sees its own credentials. The MCP server authenticates on the agent's behalf.
• Access is deny-by-default. Even with valid credentials, only policy-allowed secrets are accessible.
• Secret values are fetched just-in-time and must never be stored, echoed, or included in summaries.
• Agents cannot create email-based shares (prevents unsolicited email sharing).
• Intents API is opt-in. When enabled, raw key reads are blocked.
• Transaction guardrails are human-controlled and server-enforced.
• Token revocation: DELETE /v1/auth/token (or SDK auth.logout()) revokes the current Bearer token; revoked tokens return 401.
• Request body limit: 5MB max; larger requests return 413.

---

Error Handling

Code	Meaning	Action
400	Bad request	Check request body format
401	Not authenticated	Token expired — re-authenticate
402	Quota exhausted / payment required	Body may include required_usd, message. Intents submit over quota: 0.25% of tx value; top up credits or send X-PAYMENT for required amount. Otherwise upgrade at 1claw.xyz/settings/billing
403	No permission	Ask user to grant access via a policy. Or: guardrail violation (check error detail)
403	Resource limit reached (type: "resource_limit_exceeded")	Tier limit on vaults/secrets/agents hit — ask user to upgrade at 1claw.xyz/settings/billing
404	Not found	Check path with list_secrets
405	Method not allowed	Wrong HTTP verb for this endpoint
409	Conflict	Resource already exists (e.g. duplicate vault name)
410	Gone	Secret expired or max access count reached — ask user to store a new version
422	Validation error or simulation reverted	Check input. For simulate_first: transaction would revert
413	Payload too large	Request body over 5MB — reduce payload size
429	Rate limited	Wait and retry. Auth routes: 5 req burst, 1/sec. Share creation: 10/min/org

All error responses include a detail field with a human-readable message.

---

Best Practices

1. Fetch secrets just-in-time. Call get_secret immediately before the API call that needs the credential.
2. Never echo secret values. Say "I retrieved the API key and used it" — never include raw values in responses.
3. Use describe_secret first to check existence or validity before fetching the full value.
4. Use list_secrets to discover available credentials before guessing paths.
5. Rotate after regeneration. If you regenerate an API key at a provider, immediately rotate_and_store the new value.
6. Use grant_access for vault-level sharing — creates a fine-grained policy with path patterns.
7. Use share_secret for one-off sharing — creates a time-limited, access-counted share link.
8. Simulate before signing. Always use simulate_first: true (default) or call simulate_transaction before submit_transaction.
9. Check list_vaults before creating. Avoid creating duplicate vaults.
10. Handle 402 gracefully. Billing/quota errors should be surfaced to the user, not retried.

---

Billing Tiers

Tier	Requests/mo	Vaults	Secrets	Agents	Price
Free	1,000	3	50	2	$0
Pro	25,000	25	500	10	$29/mo
Business	100,000	100	5,000	50	$149/mo (+ CMEK)
Enterprise	Custom	Unlimited	Unlimited	Unlimited	Contact (+ CMEK + KMS delegation)

Overage methods: prepaid credits (top up via Stripe, deducted per request) or x402 micropayments (per-query on-chain payments on Base).

Audit, org, security, chain, billing, and auth endpoints are free and never consume quota.

---

Links

• Dashboard: 1claw.xyz
• Docs: docs.1claw.xyz
• Status: 1claw.xyz/status
• API: https://api.1claw.xyz
• SDK: @1claw/sdk on npm
• OpenAPI Spec: @1claw/openapi-spec on npm
• MCP Server: @1claw/mcp on npm
• CLI: @1claw/cli on npm
• GitHub: github.com/1clawAI
• Support: [e-mail]