Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is transparent about paid NetIntel lookups, but it documents unpinned wallet/payment setup commands that may handle funds or private keys.
Install only if you are comfortable with pay-per-call external lookups. Use a dedicated low-balance wallet, set per-call and session limits, require explicit approval for paid calls, and avoid running unpinned `npx ...@latest` wallet or MCP commands with private keys unless you have independently reviewed and pinned the package version.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
requires:
anyBins:
- npx
- curl
envVars:
- name: EVM_PRIVATE_KEY
required: false
The skill states that payments are 'usually automatic' and that some wallet integrations pay every 402 they meet without asking. Even though the document later advises obtaining user authorization, the default behavior described here can enable autonomous spending if an agent follows the flow naively or if prompts trigger repeated paid lookups.
## Payment, authorization and spending limits — read before any paid call
- **Payment is usually automatic.** The `netintel` MCP server with a key, AgentCash and the
Coinbase Agentic Wallet pay every 402 they meet without asking; Coinbase Wallet MCP asks the
user to approve each payment. The prices in this file are what a call costs; they are
**not** a spending cap.
- **Get the user's authorization before paid calls.** Tell the user what you intend to call
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
## How to call and pay
Every endpoint is a plain HTTPS URL, so this skill works on its own with whichever wallet the
agent already has. Use the first option that applies. **Never ask the user to paste a private
key into the conversation.** Send the header `X-NetIntel-Via: skill` with these calls (as below):
it only tells NetIntel which integration a call came from and changes nothing about the call or
its price.
The skill instructs users to execute npx awal@latest, which fetches and runs code from the registry at invocation time without pinning an immutable version. If the package or a dependency is compromised, or a breaking release is published, the agent could execute attacker-controlled code with wallet and environment access.
This line repeats use of npx awal@latest for a paid POST flow, again causing unreviewed remote code to be downloaded and executed at runtime. Because the command is tied to payment operations, compromise could lead to wallet misuse, payment redirection, or secret theft.
The setup command npx -y agentcash@latest installs and runs a wallet/payment tool without version pinning. That creates a supply-chain execution risk, especially dangerous because the tool may handle funds and authenticated payment requests.
This login/setup path also uses npx awal@latest, exposing users to the same supply-chain risk during wallet authentication. A compromised package could capture credentials, session tokens, or manipulate subsequent payment behavior.
The command npx -y netintel-mcp is particularly sensitive because it is shown alongside passing EVM_PRIVATE_KEY=0x… into the environment. Running an unpinned package in a context where a private key is available could result in direct key exfiltration and unauthorized asset transfers if the package or its dependencies are compromised.
No suspicious patterns detected.