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Security audit

Ddns Updator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a mostly coherent DDNS helper, but its instructions can turn ordinary public-IP questions into DNS-changing updates using a provider token.

Review this before installing if you want strict control over DNS changes. Use only explicit DDNS update prompts, keep the dynv6 token scoped appropriately, and verify the missing referenced scripts before relying on it. Treat public-IP-only requests as read-only unless you intentionally want DNS records updated.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (6)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger guidance is broad enough to activate on ordinary requests about public IPs or DNS, which can cause the agent to run networked scripts and potentially update DNS records when the user only wanted informational help. In an agent setting, overbroad invocation criteria increase the chance of unintended side effects from ambiguous natural-language requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

md
## Quick start

### 1️⃣ Create the config file

**Outside** the skill directory, in your home config folder:

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 73)May include surrounding context.

} EOF

chmod 600 ~/.config/picoclaw-ddns/config.json

text

> 🔒 **Why chmod 600?** The token is sensitive — only the file owner should read it.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 76)May include surrounding context.

} EOF

chmod 600 ~/.config/picoclaw-ddns/config.json

text

> 🔒 **Why chmod 600?** The token is sensitive — only the file owner should read it.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 231)May include surrounding context.

md
| Concern | Mitigation |
|---------|------------|
| Token leaks | Config file at `~/.config/picoclaw-ddns/config.json` with `chmod 600` |
| Public IP APIs | Read-only, no auth needed, multiple fallback sources |
| Agent context | The SKILL.md never exposes real tokens — only the scripts read the config |
| Publishing | The skill folder contains **no** credentials or secrets |

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The agent-triggering section gives only positive examples and no scope boundaries, so routine conversational requests about IPs may be interpreted as authorization to execute the skill. This is less severe than direct code injection, but it can still lead to unintended network calls and DNS modifications in response to ambiguous prompts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.