T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:75- Finding
Unpinned Skill Installation from a Mutable Package Registry
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:75-78andREADME.md:8-11
Vulnerability Type: T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
SKILL.md:75-78:bash ## Installation Command clawhub install decision-frameworkREADME.md:8-11:bash ## Quick Installation clawhub install decision-frameworkTechnical Analysis
The documented installation command identifies the skill only by package name. It does not pin an immutable version, content digest, source revision, or verified artifact checksum. The documentation also does not require verification of a publisher signature or the contents resolved by the package registry.
Consequently, the installed content can differ from the content reviewed in this audit if the registry entry is updated, compromised, transferred to another publisher, or affected by package-name substitution. This is a supply-chain risk: the effective package is resolved at installation time from external mutable state rather than being cryptographically bound to the audited artifact.
The reviewed project itself contains only Markdown documentation and does not include executable scripts. Therefore, this finding does not establish that the currently published dependency is malicious. It identifies an unsafe installation pattern that could permit unaudited future content to be installed.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the package registry account, registry infrastructure, or package publication process for
decision-framework. - The attacker publishes a modified package under the same package name.
- A user follows the documented
clawhub install decision-frameworkcommand. - The package manager resolves and installs the attacker-controlled package because no immutable version or digest is specified.
- If the substituted package contains executable hooks, malicious scripts, or hostile agent instructions, those compo ...[truncated 702 chars]
- An attacker compromises the package registry account, registry infrastructure, or package publication process for
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the installation to an immutable package version and, where supported, a cryptographic content digest.
- Publish and verify a SHA-256 or stronger checksum for the exact package artifact.
- Require registry publisher-signature verification before installation.
- Document the expected registry and publisher identity explicitly to reduce package-substitution risk.
- Inspect the resolved package manifest, scripts, hooks, and skill instructions before activation.
- Perform installation and initial execution in a sandbox with minimal filesystem, network, credential, and tool permissions.
- Add a lockfile or signed provenance statement binding the documented release to the reviewed source revision.
- Update both
SKILL.mdandREADME.mdso all installation examples use the same verified, immutable release reference.
